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ABSTRACT 
In this analysis, it has been attempted to reflect some light into the 
enigmatic future of the new Russian foreign policy towards Central Asia. To 
this end, elucidating and discussing the changes in the nature of Russian 
foreign policy reflected in two phases of time towards Central Asia in terms of 
economic, ethnic, political, strategic, ideological and military motives has 
become imperative. 
A review of groups in the foreign policy making processes are given, and 
the two dominant schools of foreign policy making: the Atlanticist and 
Eurasianist schools are examined. The implications of the presence of 1 O 
million ethnic Russians living in the Central Asian states, an interdependent 
economic system , the peacekeeping and defense agreements , and the role of 
Islam in the shaping of politics in Russia towards Central Asia are analyzed 
with two case analyses. In order to be able to have a full picture of the future 
balances in Central Asia, Turkish and Iranian roles are also heeded and placed 
into the Central Asian picture. 
The final analysis is devoted to clarification of the Russian position in 
Central Asia, with the aim of injecting some predictability to the unknown future 
of a recently growing region in world politics. 
OZET 
Rusya Federasyonunun yeni enigmatik Orta Asya 
politikasin1n yannin1, iki zamanll degi9imlerin ekonomik, etnik, siyasi, ideolojik ve 
askeri temalarla incelenmesi ile ayd1nllga kavu9turulmas1na yoneliktir. 
019 politikanm §ekillenmesinde nufuz sahibi olan "Atlantik9i" ve 
"Avrasyac1" d19 politika okullanndan bahsedilmi9tir. Rusya'nin Orta Asya 'ya 
yonelik yeni politikalannin §ekillenmesinde, b61gede ya9ayan on milyon etnik 
Rus'un varl1g1, birbirine a§in derecede bag1mll ekonomileri ve savunma yap1lan , 
yetmi§ y1ll1k Sovyet kulturunun etkisi ve buna kar91llk islamiyetin gittik<;e artan 
rolu belirleyici olmaktad1r. Bu baglamda Orta Asya'nin yeni yeni §ekillenmekte 
olan resmi 9izilirken, Turkiye ve iran 'in da bu resme dahil edilmesi ka91nilmaz 
olmaktad1r. 
Son bolumdeki analiz, Rusya'nm Orta Asya'daki politikalanni anlamaya , 
a91kl1ga kavu9turmaya ve uluslararas1 sistemin bilinmeyen karanllginda gun 
ge9tik9e 6nem kazanan Orta Asya ulkelerinin durumlanna biraz olsun 1~1k· 
tutmaya aynlm1§t1r. 
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I - INTRODUCTION 
The disintegration of the Soviet Union which is considered by the current 
historians to be the most significant incident of the twentieth century, has left 
Russia searching for a new basis for its security and foreign policy. Undergoing 
sharp reassessments of its new state, borders and national interests in the wake of 
the collapse of not only 70 years of communism but also of long years of colonial 
empire, Russia has to distinguish between the prospects of imperial 
disengagement and responsible power. 
The aim of this study toward an understanding of the argument surrounding 
the Russian Federation's new view of the world is, to examine the new Russian 
Policies in Central Asia in the post-Cold War era. Neo-Russian foreign policies 
are discussed in terms of economic, political, ethnic, military and geostrategic 
parameters. 
While Russia is now a state without the reach of a superpower, it still 
retains strong influence and interest around its borders. It is Russia's new concept 
that has become to be known as the "Near Abroad " , incorporating the security 
and defense of the former Republics of the Soviet Union to its own, that has 
caused the most concern in the West over the nature and direction of the new 
Russian foreign policy . The belief that Russia should fill the security vacuum in 
Central Asia and incorporation of this belief into the official doctrine has resulted 
in the formulation of a new assertive foreign policy led by the Eurasianist school of 
foreign policy by late 1992, until today. 
The aim of this study is to explain and discuss the changes in the nature of 
Russian foreign policy reflected in two phases of time towards Central Asia in 
terms of economic, ethnic, political, strategic and military motives with the 
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objective of injecting some constants of predictability to the future of Russian 
foreign policy in Central Asia, after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. 
In attempting to understand the basics of the new Russian foreign policy 
towards Central Asia, certain questions are put forward : What are the factors 
contributing to Russia's assertiveness, what are the factors inhibiting the 
establishment of a nee-Russian zone , what are the parameters of Russian action 
in Central Asia, what are the Russian sensitivities in Central Asia, which are the 
positions of other states policies for dominance in Central Asia ..... ? How does this 
effect policy formulation inside ? 
In attempt to make an introduction to the subject, and answer the questions 
above, a review of the present international system is given with a special 
emphasis on the political- geostrategic vacuum created by the disintegration of 
the former Soviet Union. The new role played by Russia is explained is terms of 
the unique economic, ethnic, geostrategic, factors linking the Central Asian 
Republics to it . The groups in Russian foreign policy making are also covered in 
the Second Chapter. 
"Policy towards Central Asia" debate in Russia has developed in two major 
phases of time among two camps : The first camp and phase in Russian Foreign 
Policy is characterized by the ascendance of the Atlanticists to power, who had a 
pro- Western approach to foreign-policy which resulted in distancing itself from 
the near abroad. In the second phase, starting from mid-1992, the Eurasianists 
became the dominant school in foreign policy-making , incorporating the security 
of their Near Abroad to their own. 
2 
The Eurasianist school of foreign policy is emphasized throughout the 
study as it constitutes the dominant path of action since 1992, until the present 
time. 
In the Third Chapter, the Near Abroad Concept is analyzed. The factors 
contributing to Russia's being assertive in its Near Abroad are discussed within 
the framework of the Eurasianist school : implications of the concept is given upon 
Central Asia is presented. In this context, the ethnic Russians living in Central 
Asia are presented as the central theme to the understanding of the Near Abroad 
concept. The concentration will be upon the Russian commitment to guarantee 
the security and stability of its Near Abroad in Central Asia . 
With its geographical proximity to Russia and the presence of a large 
Russian population, the Kazakh case is illustrated as the litmus test for the 
relations between Central Asian states. The factors contributing to the 
establishment of a neo-Russian sphere of influence in Central Asia are discussed 
analyzing the impact of several factors: 1 O million ethnic Russians living in 
Central Asia, the economic network of the former Soviet Union instituted on the 
rationale of interdependence, the geostrategic factor ; incorporating the security of 
the Near Abroad by military doctrine . Seeing the stability of its Near Abroad 
integral to its own security , which for example resulted in its intervention in the 
Tajik crisis and the consideration of the fundamentalist and pan-nationalist 
threats emanating from various sources as major threats to the stability of 
Russia, have pushed it toward pursuing a policy of special responsibility in 
Central Asia. 
The Tajik case is illustrated as an example of the Russian sensitivity on 
the fundamentalist threat where in the context of the Eurasianist school, it has 
undertaken military and political responsibility to serve for the security and 
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stability of its Near Abroad. The Tajik case also exemplifies the nature and 
format of Russian peacekeeping role in the post-Cold War era in Central Asia. 
Nature does not bare vacuum: competition for Central Asia is a reality! In 
Chapter IV, the role and activities of Turkey and Iran are discussed and their 
impact on the formulation of Russian foreign policy is given as external factors . 
The discussion of the Turkish and Iranian roles are inalienable to the 
understanding of the balances of Central Asia . The Turkish role is the secular and 
modern one, which is backed by the Western world while that of Iran is 
associated with the fundamentalist and isolationist one. An assessment of the 
implications of the new Turkish role in Central Asia upon Turco-Russian relations 
is also presented. 
The corner-stone of this thesis is that Russia is undeniably the dominant 
external power in Central Asia. Not only through the use of its inherited power at 
hand, but also through manipulating these assets to gain maximum gain out of 
them, Russia will extend its influence to its Near Abroad. The successful transition 
for the post -Soviet space depends on the condition that the well-entrenched 
economic, political, demographic, cultural and military ties be preserved in the 
short-run. It is inevitable that in the long-run relations will be diversified and the 
age-old relationships with Russia will take a new style. Yet, for the time being, it is 
both to the interest of Russia and the Central Asian Republics that this special 
relationship is sustained. 
Based on this reasoning, the study seeks to present an analysis of the 
parameters of the new-Russian policies towards Central Asia and project some 
form of predictability to the future as to how the Russians will formulate their 
policies towards Central Asia. 
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In the concluding Chapter, a realistic appraisement of the future of 
Central Asia is presented with a special emphasis on the inevitable and assertive 
nee-Russian role in Central Asia. 
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CHAPTER II -GROUPS AND SCHOOLS IN RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY - MAKING 
The last decade of the 20 th century has brought unexpected changes to 
the entire international order, transforming geopolitical relations all around the 
world. One of these most striking changes in the international order has been 
the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The Soviet successor republics, 
particularly, the Central Asian States, 1 present a considerable challenge and 
opportunity for observation and analysis of some of the most pressing 
ingredients of the post-Soviet international relations. Russian Federation, now 
the inheritor of the former USSR power apparatus, has to reformulate its 
policies towards its South, i.e. Central Asia. The old relationship is over de jure 
but it continues de facto. The conjuncture in which Russian foreign policy 
develops is now totally different; now there is the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS), and no USSR; the Russian Ruble is replaced by 
national currencies, Russian as the lingua franca is being replaced by the 
dialects of Turkic and Tajik, the Cyrillic alphabet is being replaced by Latin or 
Arabic, the atheist system is replaced by the revival of religion (both Islam and 
Christianity), Russian bureaucrats are replaced by natives, and closed 
economies are in the process of liberalization. Everything is changing but , 
what is still on the agenda is the special link between the Russians and 
Central Asians: it is the centuries' long affinity which still dominates their 
relationship. 
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Russia, with its geopolitical parameters reduced, is on the verge of 
defining its place in the new international order. The collapse of the Soviet 
Union does not mean the end of its influence: the transformation process 
involves both continuity and change. The biggest problem facing Russia today 
is how to handle its post-imperial mentality: being the strongest country of 
Central Asia whose ambition is to maintain the status-quo, it needs to learn 
how to lose an empire and assume a new role in the region and in international 
affairs. 
Russia's struggle to set up a new foreign policy has intensified, 
following the dramatic changes in the domestic and international environment 
at the end of the Cold War2. It now has to attune itself to the loss of the empire, 
together with the resultant economic chaos which inhibits its ability to address 
the problems it confronts in domestic and foreign policy. Given its unique 
geographical status, straddling two continents and surrounded by regimes in 
transition, Russia is destined to play a leading role in Central Asia. 
Russian Foreign Policy since December 1991, has gone through 
several fluctuations. It has began to retrench from a strong Atlanticist approach 
it used to adopt early from the beginning of 1991 to a Eurasianist one.3 Russia 
wants to be recognized as a great power whose interests range beyond the 
former Soviet Union towards Central Europe. Emphasizing that it has a special 
relationship with its "Near Abroad", Russia is keen to establish a 
commonwealth. The Russian elite is insistent that internal stability in the 
Russian Federation is dependent on the stability of the Near Abroad. 
Therefore, guaranteeing their stability is a precondition, whether welcomed 
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or not. Being a great power, Russia started to exert influence over its Near 
Abroad for reasons of prestige, to ensure the access to raw materials, to 
prevent conflicts outside their borders from spilling over, and in some cases to 
defend their perceptions of cultural sovereignty. However, one need not take 
this an imperial intention to re-establish the former Soviet Union, since Russia 
undeniably needs a strong economic base, capable of sustaining massive 
military power over extended periods. Domestic political and economic crises is 
far from being resolved, which inhibits its outward move. Since December 
1991, Russia has been struggling to reform its economy, dismantling the 
centralized Soviet economic structure and introduce free-market economics, 
and restructure its political apparatus by creating new institutions appropriate 
to a democratic political system.4 
A referendum was held on the future of the Soviet Union in March 1991, 
where most voted for its continuation. After the fruitless coup and the 
declarations of independence by the Baltic Republics, the President of the 
Russian Federation, Boris Yeltsin, advocated a substitute for the USSR, in the 
form of a new political body; namely, the Commonwealth of Independent States 
(CIS). Yeltsin won the battle over Mikhail Gorbachev when the military 
supported the formation of CIS. The three-partite agreement which laid down 
the basis of the CIS was composed of the Russian Federation, Belarus and 
the Ukraine. Central Asian Republics which were subsidized by Russia were 
considered as a burden, and were excluded from the Union at first. The 
Russians wanted to consolidate their status in Europe through a homogenous 
Slavic composition. 
It was late 1991 when 11 states joined the CIS, including the Central 
Asian States. However, in spite of Russian attempts to sustain the CIS, a 
contradictory pattern emerged soon. Ukraine set up its own army and customs, 
and ceased to work as part of the commonwealth.5 By 1992, the hopes for 
establishing a combined military force were damaged, the ruble zone which 
was initiated in 1991, failed in 1993. The Russians moved towards Western-
oriented policies and welcomed Western advice in economics and foreign 
policy in their transition period. 
2.1 Groups in Russian Foreign Policy Making 
The environment and parameters of Russian Foreign Policy has 
changed due to certain factors: the disintegration of the USSR, economic and 
social crises and the vacuum in foreign policy leadership has emerged in 
Russia as well as changes in the international environment. The Russians lost 
outposts, colonies and a well established bureaucratic network through the 
nomenclature.6 The geopolitical parameters have been reduced, and today 
Russia is facing a new strategic environment. A phenomenal decline in 
production, a high budget deficit, galloping inflation, growth of foreign debt, and 
a decline in gold reserves put Russia in a position of extreme dependence on 
the Group 7. But, despite this backdrop, it remains one of the world's great 
powers both because it is still a nuclear power and because, former patterns of 
political behavior die hard, if at all. 
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Currently groups which affect Russian Foreign Policy are, 
Moderate Liberals (Headed by Former Soviet Ambassador to the US 
Vladimir Lukin) The Moderate Liberals are distinguished by their rational 
attitude towards Russia and the world at large, emphasizing Russia's particular 
security priorities based on its geopolitical position and the transitional stage 
which places top priority on Russia's relations with the former USSR successor 
states. One of the major goals involves greater interaction with the West, but 
through hard bargaining and not through the automatic acceptance of all 
aspects of Western policies, they are against excessive reliance on Western 
aid and they are more realistic than the reformers, but they still look to the 
West. They are for hard bargaining for a Western model. 
They emphasize that Russian foreign and security policy priorities must 
be based on the specifics of Russia's geopolitical and preferential position and 
in terms of its domestic transitional situation. This places the highest priority on 
Russia's relations with the former Soviet Republics. 
The Moderate Liberals think that the Helsinki Principle of the 
inviolability of borders form the basis of the relationship between the republics 
and revision may only be possible as a result of peaceful negotiations. Ethnic 
separatism within the republics should be discouraged, moreover, military 
support by any state of ethnic separatists beyond its border should be 
prohibited. The only exception allowing border revision will be upon the 
initiative of an individual republic or in case where a republic is engaging in 
outright genocide against a national minority. 1 To protect the rights of 
minorities, various sanctions are admissible, including the use of force as a 
last resort. Still, approval by international organizations by the UN, CSCE, CIS 
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is obligatory. This applies fully to the 30 million Russians living outside the 
Federation. In some cases, vital Russian interests may come into confrontation 
with other republics in contradiction to the aim of maintaining good relations, 
because of protecting the rights of Russians living outside the Russian 
Federation. There exists a strong sense of independence upgrading economic, 
humanitarian, cultural, and security concerns among the former Soviet 
Republics. A concordant policy of respect, recognition of the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of the other republics, and fair and equal cooperation in 
various fields would be the best way to control the centrifugal forces affecting 
the territories of the former Soviet Union. They argue that Russia as in the case 
of Tajikistan, should be very cautious, not take sides, waste resources and 
lives in support of one faction against another. The principle Russian role 
should be of an impartial, creative broker, and mediator in settling conflicts. 
Centrists and Moderate Conservatives: (Headed by the former Russian 
Vice President Alexander Rutskoi ) 
This group does not reconcile itself to the disintegration of the USSR, yet it 
does not favor resorting to force for re-integration. They want a Russia which 
is independent within its sphere of influence and one who has a say in world 
affairs. Further, they are against excessive reliance on Western economic 
assistance and political guidance. They advocate the diversification of Russia's 
partners towards China, Iran, Turkey and India, putting emphasis on the 
preservation of nuclear weapons and expansion of exports of nuclear 
technology. This approach is mostly supported by the military high command 
and industrialists. They advocate close relations with the West, yet 
emphasizing the increase of the role of Russia as the great power and 
independent within its sphere of influence. They suggest that Russia should 
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diversify its attitudes towards China, India, Iran and Turkey while the necessity 
to preserve the substantial military power is underlined. They call for the 
expansion of Russian foreign trade, and exports of nuclear technology and 
material as a way of gaining hard currency. They want better relations with the 
West, but not at the cost of reducing Russia's sphere of influence in the Near 
Abroad. 
Neo-Communists and Nationalists: ( Headed by Dimitri Vasilev, and 
Vladimir Zhirinovsky) 
This group, also called the 'red browns', are for the idea of the revival of the 
Russian empire on the basis of great-Russian nationalism. These hard-liners 
are in favor of a harsh military build-up and are against the Strategic Arms 
Reduction Treaty (START - 2) and Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE), or 
unilateral cuts and withdrawals in the Russian army. The opponents wanted to 
carry Russian foreign policy to a new level of relations and transcend the 
traditional framework of geopolitical and strategic balances. Devoted to the 
goal of revival of the Russian Empire on Great Russian nationalism, they 
support a fundamentalist version of the Russian Orthodox religion and a 
vigorously anti-Western crusade . 
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2.2- Schools in Russian Foreign Policy 
2.2.1 The Atlanticist School 
Starting from 1991 until mid-1992, the Atlanticists ascended to 
power and are characterized by the predominance of domestic 
considerations. Asserting that foreign policy is closely related to domestic 
policy they underline that, domestic considerations shape foreign policy 
making. The most important function of Russian foreign policy to them is to 
create an international environment that will enable Russia to become a 
democratic, market-oriented member of the international community. 
The Atlanticist school also argues that, 
First, Russia must join the G-7, CSCE, the Paris Charter, and 
harmonize with international institutions to achieve this end. Russia can only 
find its proper place in this system if it pursues the western model. The Helsinki 
Declarations, the CSCE, the Paris Charter are the institutional frameworks to 
which Russian foreign policy will adhere in formulating foreign policy. These 
will also constitute the only mechanism to protect Russian ethnic presence 
outside the Federation, living within the borders of the former Soviet Union. 
That is why the 7+ 1 Formula which is the de facto inclusion of Russia into the 
decision-making of the G-7 group is accepted by the Russians. 
Secondly, that Russia is and must remain as a "normal power", it 
can not have imperial ambitions of a Soviet scale and in the multipolar 
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environment of the international scale. Russia thus will have to continue to 
guard the Central Asian states by extending them defense guarantees, 
economic subsidies, and other sorts of privileges, but without an imperial logic. 
That, being a Eurasian state, Russia is a bridge between the East 
and West and must function as a "mechanism of transition". The continuer 
state will shed its Asiatic image and transform the Central Asian parts of the 
former Soviet Union to the standards of the Western world. 
Lastly, now for the first time in history without a viable enemy, Russia 
is considered to be secure, although other sources of dangers persist, such as 
nationalism and fundamentalism . The Russian security system is built upon 
partnership with the USA and EU by confidence building measures, where 
disarmament must be enhanced, and the CIS Collective Security system must 
be strengthened which constitutes the core of this system. s The Russian and 
American Partnership and Friendship Treaty of 17 July 1991 is an example of 
this tendency. 
2.2.1.a The Kozyrev Factor :As the prime example of the Atlanticist 
school, the Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, favored the adoption of a 
Foreign Policy which would complement Yeltsin's program of economic 
revitalization, thus linking domestic and foreign policies. He wanted the 
Russian Federation to act as a normal, but responsible power which required 
some change in its policies towards other Soviet successor states. The main 
tenets of Kozyrev's foreign policy are as follows; 
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1) full partnership: Kozyrev wanted all successor states to view 
each other as independent but equal partners. This would also involve some 
rapprochement with the West and a Full Partnership with Western countries 
and the USA, NATO Partnership for Peace. 
2) stop the use of unilateral force: Kozyrev necessitated reliance 
on international mediating mechanisms like the UN, CSCE, and NATO for 
conflict resolution. At various occasions, he said that he was against unilateral 
use of force in conflict resolution, and favored conflict resolution through 
peaceful means. For example, the will of Russia to have its soldiers and troops 
participate in the Near Abroad into Blue Helmets 9, was shared by Tajikistan 
too. (On 6.3.1994 Tajikistan announced that they wanted the CIS forces in their 
Republic be put under the UN framework.) Russia will seek to push for a 
mandate form the UN or CSCE where it seeks to legitimize its presence and 
intervention in the Near Abroad even if this legitimization process involves the 
international community to exploit CFE standards. But the international 
community is still reluctant to change the CFE standards. 
3) distancing from Muslim Central Asia: The Eurocentric approach 
advocated by Kozyrev and the Yeltsin administration also involved distancing 
from "Muslim" Central Asia. They thought that close cooperation at this stage 
would not only endanger the democratic and liberal-economic policies of 
transition in Russia, but would also put an extra burden on the Russian 
Federation which is on the verge of its own radical economic reform program. 
The rationale here may be that Russia might better concentrate its energy and 
resources on domestic problems and give up Central Asia for the time being 
which is underdeveloped and , unstable . It was because of this that the 
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trilateral Minsk Meeting of 1991 only involved the three Slavic Republican 
Presidents and the Muslim States of the former Soviet Union were excluded. 
However, Kozyrev's policy was criticized at home especially by anti-
reform defenders of Soviet power, and those who were unhappy about Soviet 
disintegration. These critics had a point in common: they all underlined that 
Kozyrev had undermined Russian national security interests, and had too 
much of an institutional approach to international relations. Although the Cold 
War antagonisms were over, The pro-Western stance was not a safe strategy 
because Russia had distinct national interests in Europe, Asia, and the Middle 
East, which could at many instances come into conflict with the West. 
Therefore, foreign policy must never be oriented towards the West alone. He 
was also criticized for his excessive reliance on international mediating 
institutions due to the increasing number of ethnic conflicts in the periphery of 
Russia, where use of force sometimes became the immediate solution and in 
places where the UN, CSCE, were not inclined to get involved. These critics 
favored an activist, energetic and assertive diplomacy. Given its geographic, 
historical and economic ties with the successor states of the former Soviet 
Union, there is an unavoidable Russian interest in the periphery. Further, given 
the presence of 30 million ethnic Russians in the periphery, Russia has 
engaged interests in the region. Critics underlined the neglect of Russia's 
geostrategic and geopolitical interests in the new order of the international 
relations. While the most urgent goal is Russia's integration into the West, this 
approach is criticized on the basis that it underestimates Russia's state 
tradition and heritage in that it has been a mix of the Slavs and Turks , the 
Christian and the Muslim for centuries. 
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The critics on the Atlanticist approach to foreign policy underlined 
the Diplomacy of Yes . The foreign policy decision-making mechanism was 
irregular and lacked any substantial constituency. Kozyrev was accused as a 
traitor, he was criticized for giving up national interests easily and saying Yes to 
the foreigners, especially on matters of nuclear disarmament and 
peacekeeping. Another criticism was due to the lack of foreign policy priorities: 
This criticism focused on the lack of control over defense plans and programs, 
ill-concentrated initiatives about joining NATO, retargeting strategic missiles 
and participating in Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), mismanagement in 
dealing with nuclear weapons in other successor states, and failure to give 
priority to relations with successor states no matter how complex and chaotic 
they are.10 
These concepts are the key not only to the protection of Russian 
military, economic, political and security interests abroad, but also to Moscow's 
relations with the USA and the European Union. A pro-Western foreign policy 
was being criticized as a humiliating course of unilateral concessions, 
exchanged for very trivial benefits, and thus, was perceived as undermining 
Russia's prestige, honor and security interests. These critiques are organized 
in a multiparty league called "The Russian Unity" and rely on the ideological 
support of Russophilic elites in the arts, academia, and mass-media. They are 
devoted to the idea of the Russian Empire and Russia's superpower role. 
Moderate liberals advocate the inviolability of borders principle of 
the Helsinki Summit, with the exception that if a genocide is taking place 
against a national minority, and if this status is classified by international law as 
such then borders inviolability would not be taken into consideration.11 In 
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pursuit of protecting ethnic minorities, various sanctions are permissible, 
including the use of force-still this requires multilateral approval and should be 
sanctioned by UN resolutions, CIS or CSCE. 12. This is a critical point since 30 
million Russians living outside the Russian Federation. Russia has a deep and 
understandable interest in these 30 million extra- territorial Russians. Yet, 
given historical memory, this legitimate interest may be perceived as a an 
excuse to re-build imperialistic ambitions. Russia may be walking on a tight 
rope to prove otherwise, all the while maintaining and claiming its legitimate 
interests. 
2.2.1.b Criticisms towards the Atlanticist Approach 
Serious criticism began to be spelled out by spring 1992, when the 
opponents of Yeltsin began to cite foreign-policy issues in their attacks against 
him. In time, the Foreign Ministry came under serious attack for ignoring the 
ethnic Russian Diaspora. Growing criticism forced the Atlanticists to address 
issues they had neglected in the early euphoria of independence, especially in 
their relations with the other successor republics of the Former Soviet Union. 
The opposition favored an energetic and assertive foreign policy which 
involved Russian military, economic and political engagement in the periphery 
of the former Soviet Union. 
Unrealistic expectations about Western support led to frustrations. 
Western powers insisted on economic and political reform prior to extending 
financial assistance to bolster this process. The critics pointed that the national 
interests of Russia were not identified and protected clearly, and the Near 
Abroad was neglected. 
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Second, due to the belief that the security of Russia and its Near Abroad 
was inseparable and mutually interdependent, Russia's new military doctrine 
prepared in November 1993, reflected an evaluation of the Eurasian area as 
Russia 's "Near Abroad, where Moscow's political and military involvement is 
legitimate. Due to their weak economic status, unstable political systems and 
dependent defense systems, the Near Abroad is likely to become subject to 
external pressure easily. 
Third, the growing concern over the ethnic Russians in the Near 
Abroad was a major factor which led to a refocussing in Russian Foreign 
Policy. The fact that the foreign ministry did little to engage Russia's new 
neighbors on this issue was another part of this criticism . 
Fourth, Kozyrev was criticized for being too pro-Western and about his 
policy of YES. His unquestionable acceptance of UN sanctions on arms 
reduction and his obstinacy about the fate of co-religionists and co-ethnics of 
the Near Abroad was criticized by his opponents most. 
Fifth, the Central Asian states demanded and insisted on a substantive 
collective security system, with active Russian participation. Being dissatisfied 
with the nuclear umbrella of the CIS for their security, they demanded a 
comprehensive security system which included practical measures in dealing 
with the conventional defense of their security and their borders. Krygyz 
President, Askar Askaev, commenting on the pivotal role of Russia said: "The 
Eurasian entity hinged on Russia would collapse if Russia ceased to be a world 
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power with painful implications for Kyrgyzstan as well. That is why we must 
make our contribution to Russia's revival".13 
Last but not least, the Islamic factor gained pace and started to raise 
serious concern in Russian foreign policy circles. The Russian policy-makers 
argued that, containing the external dimension of the "Islamic threat" would 
mean the protection of the exterior borders of the CIS. If Islam were to pervade 
the CIS, the main direction of its external route would be Iran, Afghanistan and 
Pakistan. The security of Southern borders would not only have enhanced the 
physical security of the new Central Asian Republics, but it was also loaded 
with a clear political message of Russian sensitivity to all regional actors 
towards the issue. 
The Russian Foreign Ministry, by all accounts, had already 
understood full well that the preservation of good relations and peace, within 
the CIS, is less costly than a war. Because of various deficiencies and critics 
as to the conduct of Russian foreign policy in terms of the Atlanticist school, 
the shift in foreign policy in late 1992 and early 1993 became an inevitable 
reality. 
The position of the Foreign Ministry on the rights of Russian-speakers in 
the Near Abroad shifted dramatically by the beginning of 1993, as a result of 
domestic pressures. Kozyrev stressed the importance of respect for human 
rights, and called on Western nations to back Russia's position to apply 
international norms even-handedly. Kozyrev argued against the use of 
sanctions to rectify the issue of Russian minorities' rights outside Russia. He 
pointed out that the first people to suffer from sanctions would be ethnic 
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Russians themselves. However, asserting Russia's right to defend ethnic 
Russians does not incur with international law, which prohibits forcible 
intervention against other sovereign states. 
Kozyrev argued however, that links with the West did not imply a pro-
Western policy, but a means of Russia to return to its roots, while implying that 
Russia deserved a worthy position in the group of leading Western powers. 
However, the declarations of Kozyrev were not sufficient to prohibit critics on 
his policy. 
According to the critics, the domestic constituency to support this 
foreign-policy and a political party was lacking to promote the agenda. Serious 
criticism began to be spelled out by Spring 1992 when the opponents of Yeltsin 
began to cite foreign policy issues in their attacks against him. The 
international political conjuncture giving priority in their estimation to the 
stability of Russia, and its continuing cooperation in the world affairs with the 
West, became factors contributing to the revival of Russian hegemony in 
Central Asia. The continuing importance of the former Soviet Union's economic 
order founded on a system of interdependence rendered it as a legitimate 
concern and a motivating factor for further economic-social political ties with 
the Near Abroad. 
But the questions remained as to how to integrate the criticism on 
the Near Abroad with those regarding integration with the West. Here lies the 
paradox. 
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2.2.2 THE NEO-EURASIANIST FOREIGN POLICY 
A foreign policy driven by "shared values" with the Western world 
began to shift towards a Eurasianist one by July 1992. The Russian foreign 
policy shift has been materialized by the reintegration of the Central Asian, 
Caucasian, Russian security within the institutional context of the CIS and the 
signing of bilateral agreements with the Central Asian Republics. 
In December 1993, the Foreign Ministry published a draft foreign 
policy outline, which came close to satisfying the demands of its critics. Indeed 
by the mid 1993, a consensus appeared to have emerged on the basic outline 
of Russian foreign policy. From then on a more activist Foreign Policy has 
emerged vis a vis Central· Asia, and other successor states of the former-
USSR. The Eurasianist argument is based on Russia's position straddling the 
continents of Europe and Asia which gave it a character fundamentally different 
from other states of the former Soviet Union. Hence, it should not give in to 
pressure to adopt alien 'Western values, but must strive to preserve its unique 
nature through both foreign and domestic policy choices .14 
Many of the arguments of this group were incorporated into the 
foreign-policy strategies of the official foreign policy by early 1993. The political 
in-fighting between the President and Parliament appeared to have forced 
Yeltsin's government to reconsider its foreign-policy strategies. The basic 
parameters of these strategies were namely, 
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a-Providing a conducive international environment to Russian transformation 
and reform which depends on the reassertion of Russian statehood and 
recovery of the lost ground resulting from the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
Critics did not share with the Atlanticists that foreign policy is an extension of 
domestic policy, in that no matter how shaky a transition period they were in, 
they needed to be assertive outside the Near Abroad. 
b-The West does not enjoy the priority in the ordering of international relations, 
and also unnecessary concessions to the West are considered to be 
damaging to the Russian state in transition. The underlying philosophy of 
International relations remained intact : struggle for political, economic 
supremacy is continuing, and geopolitics play pivotal role in Russian foreign 
policy. 
c-Russia must play its role as a proper great power and its foreign policy 
context should remain global. Due to its unique geostrategic location and 
resources, it could not only remain as a normal power. 
d-At a minimum, as a great power and the dominant state in the region, Russia 
deserves a "sphere of influence" in its Near Abroad, a sphere recognized and 
accepted by the Western powers. Kozyrev stated on Nezavisimaya Gazeta that 
"Russia on account of profound historical, political, cultural, and other relations 
with neighboring states, could not and did not have the moral right to remain 
indifferent to their requests for helping in securing peace .1s. 
23 
e- The use of force was not unavoidable as a fact of international life against 
Kozyrev's insistence on promoting dialogue and negotiation. The Eurasianist 
perspective has been supported by a large segment of the intelligentsia since 
late 1992. 16 
At the beginning of 1991, Russia had to define its new geostrategic 
relationship with the Central Asian states. When the Soviet Union 
disintegrated, the Russian attitude towards the Near Abroad was also based on 
wishful thinking : since all of the new Soviet successor nations had been 
victimized by the communist regime as well as the Russians themselves, they 
would be able to work together harmoniously, taking each other's interest into 
account. But, it was the West, not the Near Abroad that enjoyed the status of 
the new Russia's foreign policy priority at first. Today, no doubt that Russia will 
continue to be the major power in the Eurasian area, while the evolution of the 
domestic political situation in Russia will determine this country's policies 
towards its neighbors. 
"The Russians have always considered Central Asia significant to 
the continuation of their existence. Feodor Dostoyevski in 1881 said : 
What for? What future? What is needed of the seizure of Asia? 
What's our business there? This is necessary because Russia is not only in 
Europe, but also in Asia ; because Russia is not only a European but also an 
Asiatic country. Not only that: in our coming destiny, perhaps it is precisely 
Asia that represents our main way out ..... "In Europe we were hangers -on and 
slaves, whereas to Asia we shall go as masters. In Europe we were Asiatic, 
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whereas in Asia we, too, are Europeans. Our civilizing missions in Asia will 
bribe our spirit and drive us thither. It is only necessary that the one to Siberia, 
and then to Central Asia, and at you will see the consequences. 11 
Now Russia has the Southern borders which broadly reflects its 
position in the 18 th century. This does not mean, however, that Russia will 
exercise an improvident and overwhelming power over these states. The 
question is how Russia can with minimum cost leave its periphery while alone 
protecting its strategic interests. Russia, having a unique relationship with the 
Central Asian States due to ethnic, economic, political, military, security links in 
Central Asia willing to protect those historical politico-strategic interests. The 
Russian President Boris Yeltsin said "The Russian state has not taken its 
proper place in the World."1s The Russian demand for recognition of its status 
as a global power before the signing of the Partnership for Peace Agreement 
with NATO is a sign of this tendency. Russia is continuously interfering on 
issues of oil and gas transfers from the successor states to the outside world 
to sustain its 70 years of material exploitation. Although in the beginning, some 
had foreseen that this region had fallen into a political and strategic vacuum, 
Russian presence is being felt everywhere in the former USSR. Russia's 
geoeconomic and geopolitical parameters have changed, but there is still a 
"zone of Russian responsibility". Russian role in Central Asia today consists of 
stabilizing itself and the contiguous states whose equal and intensive 
cooperation would restore to the continent the "critical mass" of stability 19. 
Central Asia as a political economic and sociocultural entity was controlled, 
exploited and manipulated to the point that it has developed a collective 
objective and subjective dependency on the former Soviet Union and Russia 
respectively. The Russians used various methods for dominating the Central 
25 
Asians, and creating a mechanism of dependence through the absolute control 
of political and military power, large -scale economic extraction, systematic 
destruction of the traditional Muslim Central Asian society, culture, and religion. 
The objective was to create a Homosovieticus as one society, culture and 
religion. Russia is the strongest country of Central Asia whose ambition is to 
maintain the status-quo in the in the region. That is, it wants the maintenance 
of the divided and dependent situation of the Central Asian Republics, for it 
does not wish the formation of any alliances excluding the Russian factor 
.Russia will manipulate the ethnic Russian card to exert control over the Near 
Abroad. This is particularly significant for Kazakhstan where the Russians 
constitute %38 of the total population . 20 
Even if the Soviet Union is dead and is not to be re-created for a 
very long time, if at all, Russia still needs to maintain some detailed 
understanding of the politics, economy, and society of the Central Asian 
republics. These states have become among the top priorities of the new 
foreign policy of Russia. With no clear precedent, Russia had to define its post-
Soviet policy towards the Central Asian successor states as of the beginning 
of 1992. It displays a clear tendency to protect its interests: a tendency that 
survived the passage of time, and the collapse of the communist ideology. 21 
Russian Foreign policy has become assertive and nationalistic and terms like 
Near Abroad, are often used by the policy-makers after 1992. Russia wants to 
ensure that the former Soviet Union be recognized a Russia's sphere of 
influence, thus it pursues policies to prevent the use of these areas as threats 
to Russia and ensure that these areas serve as bridges outwards in the 
direction of its interests. The primary objective of Russia's mission today is to 
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be the basic guarantor of Eurasian stability :where Eurasian land surface ends 
Russia is powerless, within the Eurasian region it is the shore of stability where 
it has the mission of a giant shock absorber. It is to the disadvantage of Russia 
that a strong unified front to its South is developed since it favors dealing with 
the republics one by one because its overall bargaining power will be 
enhanced only then, and it also wants to ensure that the non-proliferation of 
nuclear weapons and missile technology and uninterrupted oil and gas 
supplies are secured. Concentration of responsibility requires Russia to be the 
sole guardian of the Soviet nuclear power. Significant as the nuclear question 
issue may be there is yet another factor which involves Russia directly in the 
affairs of Central Asian Republics. There are approximately 30 million Russians 
living outside the borders of the Russian Federation who expect continued 
protection from Moscow. These human links are reinforced by economic, 
political and military ties which have been established since the 1600s and 
which are to be preserved in order to avoid further collapse of the newly 
established system. 
Russia cannot pursue a policy of isolationism in the conflict 
perimeter of Eurasia. Instability along the perimeter of the borders of the former 
Union can break whatever remains of a stability in Eurasia, and leave Russia 
exposed to wars in its Near Abroad. Russia, as a second major military power, 
cannot escape being interdependent with the other leading military powers on 
the global spectrum. The maintenance of a balance of forces, ensuring at least 
relative stability on the one hand and the disarmament process, relieving all the 
parties concerned of some of the defense burden on the other, are considered 
to be imperative . With the official abandonment of imperialism and the 
development of democratic ideals and respect for its partners' interests and 
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equality, Russia is expected to be the major stabilizer state in the Central 
Asian region. In the perimeter of its borders, it does not have despotic and 
lawless responsibility for the lands of Central Asia. The delimitation of the 
zones of responsibility, however depends largely on the reaction of Russia's 
neighbors, and Russian success will depend on its capacity to exercise 
influence without resorting to armed force. 
The assertive namely the Eurasianist Russian foreign policy by 
1992-1993, is a pol icy of retrenchment ensuring that there is no further 
unraveling of the Russian state. Russia can not be discounted as a powerful 
actor because of its economic problems and because it is in a process of 
withdrawal from the area. Russia's interference and determination in Bosnia 
symbolized and signaled to the outside world that, Russia still matters, and it is 
rebuilding its influence at a wider context in the world. Russia tries to defend 
the ethnic Russians and act as the intermediary between the former-Soviet 
republics and other states. But, how can Russia emerge as the power to 
assert its influence while it has serious economic problems ? The answer 
partly lies in the fact that there is no other country to be able to cope with the 
problems of the new independent states. Russia bids for the role of a post-Cold 
War gendarme, but to sustain its troops, it demands financing by the UN, so 
that the peacekeeping operations would gain a legitimate international ground. 
On the verge of defining its limits and capabilities vis a vis Central 
Asia, Russia is to exercise its responsibility as a great power for the 
maintenance of global and regional stability, the prevention of conflicts, the 
steady promotion of international relations on the principles of 'supremacy of 
law' , democracy and human rights, commitments to political and diplomatic 
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methods of negotiation, the admissibility of use of force in accordance with 
international law to insure national and international security and stability. 
Openess as to the promotion of mutually beneficial relations with all countries 
on the basis of equal rights and the strategic goal of forming a belt of 
neighborliness in the Near Abroad are underlined. The need to couple the 
shaping of new relations with other former Soviet republics with a build-up of 
multilateral forms of interaction are pointed out. The main lines of action in this 
context, will be settling or preventing conflicts in the Commonwealth area; 
defending the outer boundaries of the Commonwealth, continuing the formation 
of a treaty and legal basis, military political interaction, promoting mutually 
beneficial economic cooperation , guaranteeing the rights of ethnic minorities.22 
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CHAPTER Ill- THE NEAR ABROAD CONCEPT 
Russia, in the context of the Eurasianist school of foreign policy, 
places primary significance to the rights and interests of ethnic Russians living 
in the Near Abroad. The economic resources, the vital security infrastructure, 
and the ten million Russians living in the area, make the Central Asian region 
important to Moscow. As a result, Moscow has developed a greater 
determination to pursue policies aiming to protect the pro-Russian elites in the 
region, while Russian diplomats have become less inhibited in warning 
external powers such as Turkey or Iran that Central Asia remains in Russia's 
sphere of influence. 1 Russia has also paid much attention to economic and oil 
issues of the Central Asian region , seeking to ensure that oil and gas, as well 
as other raw materials from the region remain available for the Russian and 
CIS markets. Furthermore, there has been a greater awareness that tha 
presence of large Russian communities in the Central Asian countries, many of 
whose members continue to hold important positions in the society, can 
influence developments in Russia's favor. All of these factors have 
strengthened the intention of the Russian government to see that these 
communities are integrated into their new countries and that their rights are 
protected. This also helps to minimize the possibility of forced emigrations or 
an Algerian-style war in Kazakhstan 2, which would severely damage Russiari-
Central Asian relations and would probably provoke major domestic political 
unrest. 
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Russian involvement in Central Asia is a delicate issue which 
requires the careful balancing of interests with capabilities. Russia can not 
fully control the events in the Near Abroad. However there is sufficient ground 
in Russia and Central Asia for the former to continue to be the dominant 
external power in the region. 3 Russia would naturally not want to surrender 
its preferential position in Central Asia either to Iran or to Turkey. Thus, it would 
pursue a policy to deter these states from expanding their spheres of influence 
in its Near Abroad. 
The growing awareness in Moscow in 1992 and 1993 of the 
implications of alienating Central Asia has been a major catalyst for Russia to 
define a more activist and energetic policy in the Near Abroad. In the context 
of the new foreign policy, Russia is expected to exercise its responsibility as a 
great power for the maintenance of global and regional stability, prevention of 
conflicts, steady promotion of human rights, supremacy of the law, and 
democracy. The vital security infrastructure, their huge economic resources, 
and the 10 million ethnic Russians residing in the area ( the area here implies 
the five Central Asian republics) make the region vitally important to Russia. On 
7 August 1993, Russian President Yeltsin convened a summit in Moscow which 
outlined the Russian - Central Asian relations, but a clear popular mandate was 
still missing which drove Russia towards sharing the financial and political 
burden of transition with some regional powers like Uzbekistan as it has been 
in the case of intervention in Tajikistan. Without a clear precedent, Russia 
had to define its post-imperial policy towards the Central Asian successor 
states at the beginning of 1992. By 1992, the Russian Federation became 
more assertive through an attempt to regain the initiative in promoting Russian 
security and economic interests in those countries. Its intervention into the 
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Tajik conflict reveals the dominance of this new tendency and the 
predominance of this new Eurasianist paradigm. Where do exactly the borders 
of the Russian Federation end is a significant question for observers of current 
Russian foreign policy. 
Due to Russia's immense interdependence with the Central Asian 
Republics at many levels, growing instability and conflicts in Central Asia are 
very likely to threaten , Russia's economic-social reforms and territorial 
integrity at home. In this context, preserving a dominant role across the territory 
of the former USSR has become the principal goal of new Russian foreign 
policy. This is to be achieved by the manipulation of various factors: the 
economic interdependence of the republics, the presence of 30 million of 
ethnic Russians , the Russian armed forces on the territory of others, and also 
the former Soviet apparathus especially the KBG in the republics. 
The Central Asian Republics are to remain within the sphere of 
influence in the way as the Cariabbean countries remain under American 
hegemony. The Monvrovski Doctrine a variant of the American Monroe 
Doctrine, is set up on some basic parameters: 
1. Protection of Russian minorities , towards recognizing Russia's right 
to protect Russian-speaking minorities in Central Asia, recognizing equal 
rights to all Russian-speaking inhabitants who resided in the Republics as of 
January 1, 1992 , accepting dual citizenship for all willing Russians settlers 
where today, it is only Turkmenistan that has accepted the principle of dual 
citizenship and providing equal position for the Russian language. 
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2. Preservation of the traditionally established economic links , and 
continuation of the large-scale subsidies to achieve desired political ends. 
Russian financial assistance to the Central Asian republics exceeds pre-
1989 levels , 4 which contradicts the original Atlanticist goal to shed the 
financial burden of holding the old empire together. 
3. Protect Russian interests in Central Asian oil and gas production through 
control of pipelines and transit roads as well as opposition to any 
establishement of alternative accesses. 
4. Military interventions in interethnic and domestic conflicts under the guise of 
peace-keeping. 
3.1/ Russians living in the Near Abroad 
The Russian Federation has diverse human links with the Central Asian 
republics where cross-ethnic problems and human links dominate the post-
Soviet agenda : prominent among the many ethnic minority problems that may 
threaten the stability of the international system are those involving the ten 
million ethnic Russians residing beyond the borders of the Russian Federation 
in the newly independent Central Asian republics. After 1917, a growing 
number of Russian immigrants tended to concentrate in growing urban and 
industrial centers in non-Russian regions, hence the post-Soviet Republics 
have inherited heavily Russified regions and cities within their borders. In large 
regions of Northern and Eastern Kazakhstan, adjacent to Russian territory, 
ethnic Russians constitute the overwhelming majority of the population. In 
North Kazakhstan, 66 percent of the population are ethnic Russians while only 
27 percent are Kazaks. The vast majority of the 30 million ethnic Russians 
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residing in the non-Russian republics in 1989 were permanent residents. 
According to the 1989 census data, nearly 50 percent were born in the non-
Russian republics. Today for example, Russians constitute an urban elite in 
Kazakhstan, occupying high-ranking posts in industry and science and their 
percentage in the rural population is very low. 5 
The 1 O million Russians living outside the borders of the Russian 
Federation in Central Asia expect continued protection from Moscow. Both in 
the Tsarist and Soviet epochs, Russians residing in the predominantly non-
Russian regions enjoyed the relative security that membership in the core 
imperial group confers. 6 In a broader sense, the entire Russian community 
served to transmit Russian cultural, economic, and political influence into the 
non-Russian regions. Until the authority of the Communist Party and central 
government in Moscow began to erode in the last half of the 1980s, the power 
of Moscow and its policies at the same time offered assurance to the Russians 
residing in the non-Russian republics and regions that their status would not be 
threatened by a reordering of ethnic relations. 
With the disintegration of the USSR, suddenly 1 O million Russians 
became foreigners in Central Asian states to whom Russia became a 
protective homeland in its Near Abroad. Russia granted citizenship to all 
citizens of the former successors of the Soviet Union who had not already 
adopt the citizenship of another state. 7 In search for signing dual-citizenship 
agreements with the countries of Near Abroad, Russia so far has only been 
able to sign an agreement with Turkmenistan. Other states have refrained 
from signing similar agreements due to the fear that Russia may use such as 
agreements as a pretext to interfere in the affairs of these states. After 1989, 
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significant political and economic incentives existed for the adoption of policies 
such as the return to native languages as official languages, and property laws 
that threatened the status of minority ethnic groups. 8 Since few Russians 
speak the local languages, they are bound to come upon enormous difficulties. 
They are also afraid that their children will face enormous difficulties when they 
return home if Russian is not used as the medium of education in schools. New 
language laws passed by the republics provided a spark for the growth of local 
nationalism in Central Asia . In Kazakhstan, for example, only 56,00 Russians 
out of a resident Russian population of 6.2 million claimed Kazak as a second 
language at the time of the 1989 census. 9 In many newly independent Central 
Asian Republics, the language of the native population is declared to be the 
official state language where serious problems are created. Because, Russian 
has been and will be the lingua franca in the lands of the former Soviet Union, 
this problem may produce confrontations in the long-run in that, the declaration 
of the usage of the titular languages as the official state language are seen as 
statements of nationalism. Newly issued language laws proclaim the native 
languages to be the state languages in the Near Abroad, where only a small 
percentage of the Russians are able to speak them. 
Property laws too, produce difficulties for the Russians. These laws 
declare the land and its natural resources to be the property of the native 
people which inhibits the ambition of Russians of living in these countries as 
far as their future is concerned. The Central Asian Russians are also facing 
problems when they return to Russia, and suffer a culture shock. Having lived 
in a completely different culture, they can not easily adopt to their new life in 
Russia. 
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The new Russian definition of interests and sphere of influence in 
the former Soviet Union is accompanied in the statements of Kozyrev and 
officials of the Russian military . At a conference on January 1994 which was 
held in Moscow, an accord on policy towards the Near Abroad among the 
Russian military and Ministry of Foreign Affairs was attained. Kozyrev indicated 
that Russia must remain strong in the regions which have been in the sphere of 
Russian interests for centuries , and avoid the emergence of a security vacuum 
in the Near Abroad rn 
In Central Asia, where economic disparities between ethnic groups 
are significant and where unemployment and under -employment in the titular 
populations is high, expressions of hostility towards Russians and other 
minorities has been on the rise. For example, in Dushanbe and Tashkent, 
approximately% 60 of the Russians surveyed in 1992 believed hostility toward 
them was increasing. 11 By 1991, a growing proportion of Russians in the non-
Russian Republics felt sufficiently threatened by rising nationalism and 
intensifying inter-ethnic conflicts to consider emigration. According to a survey 
taken by the All-Russian Center of Public Opinion in 1991, the migratory mood 
was greatest among the Russian residents of, Uzbekistan ( 25% ), Tajikistan ( 
25 % ), Kyrgyzstan ( 37 % ) (See Appendix - Table 1 ). However, in the 
interrepublican migration it was the Russians who had migrated from 
Kazakhstan in the greatest numbers to Russia , and then came Kyrgyzstan , 
followed by Uzbekistan. (See Appendix - Table 2) 
The Russian government in 1993 concluded that the protection of the 
ethnics of the Near Abroad was one of Russia's main strategic issues and their 
treatment should determine the status of relations with the former Soviet states. 
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12 One key point in the 1993 draft foreign policy doctrine included the definition 
of sources of military danger to Russia which was the mistreatment or violation 
of the rights and interests of the Russians living in the Near Abroad. ' Yeltsin 
stated this frankly in his New Year address to the state: 
I would like to address especially those people of Russia who are 
outside Russia's borders now. Dear compatriots.! You are 
inseparable from us and we are inseparable from you. We are and w11/ 
be together. On the basis of law and solidarity, we defend and will 
defend your and our common interest. 113 
Russia granted itself the right to do so without agreement with the 
other Republics and imposes this right on them. The Foreign Ministry then 
drafted a document proposing linkages between economic aid and granting 
Russia the right to establish cultural centers, or to maintain specific trade 
relations with ethnic Russians in other states. By the beginning of 1993 , the 
Russian Federation became more assertive in its foreign policy which is 
rationalized by an attempt to regain the initiative in promoting Russian security 
and economic interests in its Near Abroad. As regards the human links 
reinforced by massive economic, political and military ties that have been 
established since the 1600s, they had to be preserved in order to avoid the 
further collapse of the system. 
The status of ethnic Russians pose the most serious problem for the 
Central Asian successor states, in the process of gaining sovereignty and the 
re-definition of national self-identity, since the Russian minority situation lies at 
the crux of the involvement of Russian Federation in the affairs of Central Asian 
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successor states. With the painful breakdown of the extremely interdependent 
economies of the post-Soviet states, 10 million Russians in Central Asia 
suddenly became foreigners. The indigenous population is afraid that Russia 
will pursue its old imperialistic ambitions, and will seek to manipulate internal 
politics through its own interests. For example, Uzbek President Kerimov at a 
meeting in 1992, said that it was imperative that the new regimes not give 
Moscow any pretext to try to intervene in Uzbek affairs to protect and safeguard 
the lives of ethnic Russians. The Central Asians consider the problem from the 
point of sovereignty. They say that if they let Russia interfere in the name of 
ethnic Russians, this would harm their sovereignty. This would be the case if 
France intervened in Belgium to defend the French. Uzbek President Kerimov 
said: " When someone talks about the protection of Russians not in Russia but 
in Kazakhstan, I recall the times of Hitler, who started by protecting the 
Sudeten Germans'. 14 
The 30 million ethnic Russians living beyond the frontiers of the 
Russian Federation are under the de facto protection of the Russian 
Federation. The Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev underlines the special 
responsibility devolving on Russia in Central Asia and his government's intent 
"to toughly uphold the interests of the ethnic Russians living in the Eurasian 
landscape. 1s In a press conference, Russian Security Council Deputy 
Secretary Valerie Manilov stressed that the newly adopted doctrine is " 
characteristic of Russia as a great power occupying one-sixth of the world's 
land space and in whose territory lives a unique great Russian multinational 
people which has its own Russian interests " .16 
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The resettlement of millions of Central Asian Russians pose serious 
economic and social problems to the Russian state already in crisis. When the 
Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, these colonialists suddenly became foreigners 
in someone else's territory. The fate of these people in the Near-Abroad matter 
much to the Russian state. The dilemma of the Russians in these Republics 
has evoked responses from political leaders in Russia following the collapse of 
the Soviet Union that have ranged from moderate appeals for respect of human 
rights to calls for tough policies, aimed at coercing the non-Russian republics, 
and beyond this, to extreme demands for the re-establishment of the Union. 
Everyone in power in Russia thinks that they have the legitimate right to protect 
the interests and rights of the ethnic Russians in the Near Abroad. Russia 
considers this as a major strategic interest of the new state. Extreme 
nationalists like Vladimir Zhirinovsky, call for re colonization while the moderate 
conservative, Alexander Rutskoi says, "These republics call themselves 
sovereign and independent who have never had their own statehood, never in 
their history. They are all parts of Russia, the great power. 17 Zatulin advocates 
the protection of ethnic Russians and the extension of assistance for these 
minorities wherever they are concentrated to win their autonomy. Russian 
policy makers think if the rights of these ethnic Russians are not protected, 
they will return to Russia. Moreover, it is not only the civilians who are back in 
Moscow, but the soldiers who are also on the way, are very likely to face 
problems of housing , employment and adaptation back home . Russian 
President Yeltsin and his reformist Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev have 
generally sought, however, to avoid serious confrontations with other newly 
independent republics regarding the rights of the Russians living in the Near 
Abroad. The incentives for a moderate policy are tangible : any confrontation 
between Russia and the Near Abroad would risk both the future of the CIS and 
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Russia's search for aid from the West by raising spectra of Russian hegemony. 
1s Thus, a diplomacy through a combination of limited application of economic 
and political pressure was preferable . Russia has various interests in keeping 
the Russians in Central Asia where they reside and make use of several 
measures to ensure that they stay because of difficulties of employment , 
adaptation and economics in Russia. Being aware of these hardships, Russia 
has been adopting several measures to sustain the status-quo in Central Asia. 
Political Measures: Granting Dual Citizenship to the Russians living outside 
Russia is a diplomatic measure which is intended to provide Russia with a 
mechanism to interfere on behalf of its citizens in the country where they have 
their other citizenship. This would guarantee ethnic Russians the right to 
defend their interests within the former Soviet republics if they so choose. 
Turkmenistan and Russia have signed an agreement in December 1993 on 
Dual citizenship where Turkmenistan was pressed hard on this to provide a 
model for the others. Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan have made no concessions, 
arguing that granting dual citizenship would be harmful to all. Uzbek President 
Kerimov and Russian President Yeltsin signed a pledge on 2 March 1994 in 
Moscow guaranteeing the rights of ethnic minorities. 19 They concluded to 
coordinate more closely in matters of taxation , economic policies, currencies 
and customs, as well as to move gradually towards free movement of goods, 
services, capital and labor between Uzbekistan and Russia. Kerimov then 
declared : " Russia should be the guarantor of peace and stability in Central 
Asia. There will always be two poles in the world, and we in Uzbekistan are 
keeping closer to Russia's pole· 20 So far, about 170.000 people residing 
outside Russia have taken up Russian citizenship, a minute fraction of those 
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who might be eligible if dual citizenship were extended throughout the former 
republics.21 
Cultural and Humanitarian Measures : The funding of radio stations, TV 
broadcasts, Russian language universities is a means by which the ethnic 
Russian elements are protected in Central Asia. Publications aimed at unifying 
the Russian diaspora are common with the objective to form a sense of 
community among the Russians who are close in custom and behavior to the 
republics they live in than to Russia. 
Economic Measures : Deliveries of fuel and raw materials to ex-Soviet 
republics are to be tied to the condition of proper and equal treatment of the 
ethnic Russians. All credits to the ex-Soviet Republics had a built-in clause 
stipulating that 20-30 % of the money should go to the needs of the Russian 
minority. 22 High -level government officials began to argue that Russia should 
give priority in its economic policies to those states willing to accept dual 
citizenship to grant Russia's rights. This echoed arguments made as early as 
1992 that Russia should distinguish within the CIS between states supporting 
this organization and those interested only in splitting it up. One proponent of 
this view in 1993, was Alexander Shokonin, then Deputy Premier, who argued 
that Russia was ' naive ' not to use its economic might to persuade its trade 
partners to accept its views on minority rights outside Russia. 23 
Peacekeeping Measures : The CIS has been given an observer status as an 
international organization by the UN. The UN Charter allows regional 
International Organizations to take action to maintain peace and security 
without any need to consult the UN or another group beforehand. 
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Russian leaders argue that the costs of maintaining peace and stability in 
Central Asia to keep the Slavic people where they live now is far greater than 
the expenses of their repatriation. Repatriation will absolutely pose a serious 
question to Russia. In the new order of things, there are many Russians in 
Central Asia who expect continued protection from Moscow. The integrated and 
unified structure of the Soviet system had buttressed the two groups by vast 
economic, social, and military ties. With disintegration, the Russian minority 
situation has become the soft-belly of the relations between Russia and its 
Near Abroad, where the former seeks to manipulate issues of aid, defense, and 
trade to attain the consequences it desires in its Near Abroad. 
Most of the tensions in the Central Asia are likely to be the result of inter-
ethnic conflicts, and most probably in Kazakhstan between ethnic Russians 
and the Kazaks where Russians constitute the largest minority. 
3.1.2 KAZAKHSTAN: THE GREAT DIVIDE 
The Russian Federation is separated from the four Central Asian 
republics by Kazak territory which stands out among the other Central Asian 
Republics by virtue of the majority of its Russian minority and its proximity to 
Russia which poses potentially the greatest extremes of potential conflict 
between Kazak nationalists and Russian national interests. With its dual 
nationality, it is a country which is literally half Russian and half Kazak. For 
these reasons, Kazakhstan will be a test case for the ethnic minority situation in 
the former-USSR, where potential Kazak-Russian relations may have 
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disastrous effects and endanger Muslim and Russian relations in the post-
Soviet era. 
From late 1989 onwards, the degree of political separation 
between Alma Ata and Moscow rose constantly in direct proportion to the 
revival of the natural process of modernization and development that had been 
frozen in the glacier of communist ideology. Kazakhstan is potentially the most 
explosive republic in Central Asia with Kazaks being in minority in the 
demographic sense. (Of the 17 million population, only 7 million are Kazaks). 
(See Appendix -Table 3) 
The industrial, economic, commercial resources of the Republic are 
mostly in the hands of non-Kazaks mostly because having been nomadic 
people, Kazaks lack a mercantilist tradition. The Slavs in the region have had 
higher standards of living than that of the local population . These people most 
of the time occupied good posts in the society, but now it is painful for them to 
bear a sharp drop in their living standards due to the general economic 
patterns in the country. 
Kazakhstan has introduced its national currency, Tenge, on 
November 1993 after the collapse of the Ruble Zone. The introduction of 
national currencies meant the loosening of the political ties and the 
coordination among the Central Asian countries and Russia. The collapse of 
the Ruble Zone has led Russia's being more insistent about the rights of its 
nationals in Kazakhstan, since it meant loosening of the Russian control over 
these Republics 
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As to Kazakhstan ,confrontation may occur on state language and 
privatization policies , democracy, and the representation of non-Kazak 
nationalities, land ownership, control of industry, natural resources and the 
territorial integrity of Northern Kazakhstan which is heavily populated by the 
Russians. 
Rumors of discrimination among the Russians in Kazakhstan started 
by 1990, but the Russians have been migrating out of Kazakhstan since the 
1970s as economic growth began to slow markedly since then. Since the 
collapse of Communist rule, those Russians who had been deported to 
Kazakhstan or the rest of Central Asia as a political punishment have also left. 
In Kazakhstan, the language issue seems to be the primary vehicle 
and symbol of nationalist aspiration. A law, making Kazak the state's official 
language took effect in 1990, and a major concern for the Russians. A 
compromise reached in September 1990, stipulated that areas with an 
overwhelmingly Russian population may use Russian in administration until 
1995, and switch to Kazak by the year 2000 where in Kazakhstan only % 1 of 
the Russians speak Kazak . 24 The Kazak nationalists, demanding the 
restoration of the damaged Kazak people and the perseverance of the Kazak 
culture started a process of Kazakhification where all Russian community 
organizations were prohibited on December 14, 1993. Most of the city names 
have and are being changed, in the education Russian language is being 
curtailed, Kazak is pushed to be the state language, and dual citizenship is 
being opposed. The necessity of restoring Islam in Kazakhstan, which is a part 
of the Kazak identity and culture, removal of the Communists from power, and 
45 
the passage of language laws are taken as imperative conditions for the Kazak 
nationalists. 
Kazak nationalism may grow and confront the Slavic population due 
to the endowment of huge reserves of oil, which Kazaks will surely wish to use 
excessively for the benefit of their own population. Among the most mighty 
symbols of sovereignty is the struggle for the control of nuclear weapons in 
Kazakhstan and this tension has reached its peak at a time when Russia is 
playing for domination over the Kazak oil. Yeltsin is insistent on the oil pipeline 
passing from the Black Sea Port of Novorossisk through Turkmenistan and 
Azerbaijan. Russia has also declared that it was planning to charge a transit 
fee from the oil and gas revenues of its neighbors. 
Kazaks now know that any rational foreign policy must incorporate the 
Russian element, being its next-door neighbor. They see the Russian threat as 
two-tiered; economic and territorial. The Kazaks want to escape the minority 
situation and construct their own demographic balances, but the ethnic 
Russians will voluntarily leave Kazakhstan, where they are well situated and 
occupy good positions. Still, because of the nationalistic environment in 
Kazakhstan, they may be forced to leave to Russia where the conditions are 
not any better. The situation in Kazakhstan frightens many when the probability 
that Russia may intervene in the name of the ethnic Russians exists, if 
discrimination increases and threatens the rights and interests of the 
Russians. 
Kazakhstan is vitally important to Russia, not only because if Russia 
loses Northern Kazakhstan from its sphere of influence, Siberia and the Urals 
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will be threatened next, but because the huge natural and mineral resources 
are vital for the continuation of the interdependent economic system. Especially 
the presence of huge oil reserves in the Tengiz oil field, in the West of 
Kazakhstan make the Russians further concerned about the future of the 
country. Cooperation with Kazakhstan is aimed to promote the policy of 
diversifying its economy, equitable exchange and equal partnership in Russian 
trade. Some Russian leaders have been less sensitive to the ethnic situation in 
Kazakhstan. Deputy Premier Alexander Shakin refused to include Kazakhstan 
in the CIS Economic Union in July 1993, and established this Union with the 
membership of the Ukraine, Russia and Belarus. This exclusion could have 
encouraged the enforced separation of the two major communities of the 
country while the Russians were looking for protection to the Russian 
Federation. It must be considered that it is only a small band of land that 
separates Kazakhstan from the Russian Republics of Moslem Tataristan and 
Bashkortostan. Extremist Russian policies would endanger Russia's relations 
with its own "inner abroad" and the Muslim world at large, because there are 
20 million Muslims living in the borders of the Russian Federation who might 
become hostile in case of perceiving imperialist policies on the part of Russia 
While Russia is a source of raw materials for the world economy, 
Kazakhstan is an additional provider of primary goods for the CIS, for Russia, 
the Ukraine and other republics. The Kazaks find the trade balance 
humiliating as the consumer sector and the manufacture of finished products 
account for only % 18 per cent of the Republics economy . 25 
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The September 1994 Summit of the Russian President Boris Yeltsin and 
the American President Bill Clinton revealed Clinton's serious consideration of 
the Russian 'Near Abroad' philosophy. Yeltsin made it clear that Russia has 
blood ties with the former Soviet Republics, and that it would react timely to any 
call issued by one of these to seek Russian protection. Clinton also agreed 
that, these countries are in Russia's sphere of influence. But, since its own vital 
interests are at stake (the American interest is towards the guarantee of the 
flow of oil from Central Asia and the control and non-proliferation of the nuclear 
weapons), the USA does not want Russia to intervene on its own in the 'Near 
Abroad' countries. USA is giving Russia the green light to intervene in the 
Near Abroad but, it stresses that, while they are doing this, they must respect 
the territorial sovereignty and independence of these states . 
Across the territories of the former Soviet Union the coming years are 
likely to be much obscure. Relations between Kazakhstan and Russia will be 
the test-case for Russo-Central Asian relationship in the post-Cold War era. 
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3.2. Military dependence, Peacekeeping, and the Nuclear Question 
The new Russian military doctrine drafted in mid-1992 focuses on 
Russia's strategic interests abroad, and make them central to security policy 
and military reform inside the Russian Federation . The newly drafted 
Russian foreign policy concept asserts that military danger implies more than 
military aggression: the suppression of rights, freedoms, and lawful interests of 
Russian citizens in foreign states also constitute a source of threat to Russian 
security . Since there are 30 million Russians living outside the Russian 
Federation, and 10 million of them living in Central Asia, this is interpreted as 
a reference to the protection of ethnic Russians and its sphere of influence in 
the Near Abroad. 
The disintegration of the USSR has raised major questions concerning 
the composition, location and the formation of the future of the military 
establishment in the former Soviet Union The former Soviet army has become 
the army of the CIS without a state. The continuing Russian military presence 
in the Near Abroad was fortified by a decree, signed by Yeltsin in April 1994, 
authorizing the military to begin negotiations to establish rights to maintain up 
to 30 military bases and facilities outside Russia. 2s The Russian Federation 
considers Central Asia as the buffer zone along its Southern border and 
through guarding the CIS border in Central Asia, it plans to control the possible 
encroachment of China and Iran which are purported to have expansionist or 
fundamentalist policies. 
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Defense and security arrangements have been the fundamental areas 
where an immediate break from the Soviet inheritance cannot be granted at 
once. In the military sphere, the Soviet structures and institutions are so 
functional and deep-rooted that they could not be given-up, if total economic 
collapse and a dangerous security vacuum is to be avoided . The Russian 
foreign policy makers are devoted to preserve the former security-defense 
structure as much as possible in order to preserve the status-quo . 
The disintegration of the USSR followed the formation of the new 
Russian Army in May 1992, which then, motivated the Central Asian Republics 
to follow the same path. However, the personnel in the Central Asian Armies 
were Russian dominated. For example, only %3 of the officers in the Kazak 
army were of Kazak nationality. Thus, it became inevitable for the Central Asian 
Republics to cooperate with Russia not only in strategic terms but also out of 
practicality, to secure their future. 
Central Asian and Russian relations are reinforced by the signing 
of mutual treaties, in that they not only provide fundamental guarantees for the 
stability of insecure domestic regimes, but also have served the interests of the 
Central Asian Republics, which have not been able to accord progress in 
developing their own armies and independent military doctrines. As a result, 
they have concluded cooperation agreements with Russia in the belief that 
mutual security guarantees will reduce the defense burden and enhance further 
economic development, in the wake of shaky transition. In this respect, there is 
a harmony of interests between the Russian Federation and the states of 
Central Asia vis a vis military issues. Although all states have formed their own 
military units because of reasons of prestige, dependence on Russia is 
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reinforced by agreements on its peacekeeping role, the lack of trained military 
personnel of their own, reliance on the maintenance and repair contacts, and 
the constant need for modernization of the armies, not to mention the control of 
nuclear weapons. 
3.2.a Peacekeeping arrangements 
Russia is increasingly trying to promote the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS) as a regional and international organization, and 
pushing it to be recognized as such by the UN, the CSCE, and other 
international bodies. This focus on the CIS is a clear example of the 
Eurasianist approach : i.e. reasserting influence in the former USSR . 
Russia, in its attempts to consolidate the CIS, plans to make use of the 
powers and functions of regional and international organizations in its new 
commanding foreign policy towards its Near Abroad. Peacekeeping is 
considered as a major tool through which Russia will be able to exert control 
over its Near Abroad. Peacekeeping is a means of recapturing and preserving 
the Russian influence in the area, where it may be useful to oppose 
"aggressive nationalism"27 and to protect the rights of ethnic Russians. Russia, 
by pushing hard for the acceptance of the CIS as an international organization, 
wanted to secure the Near Abroad as the exclusive area for Russian interests, 
thus "preventing" any other international or regional institution to come in and 
disturb its unique position there. And as far stretched as international 
institutions are, given their limited mandates and material capabilities, it was 
good timing on Russia's part to embark on such a policy. 
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Russian foreign policy makers have started to argue that the 
international community should sanction its actions, and that the rules for 
intervention in local conflicts should be changed to legitimize Russia's new role. 
The first signs of this policy can be seen where Yeltsin and Kozyrev stated that 
the international community should recognize the former Soviet Union as an 
area of Russia's vital interest, and that Russia deserved both UN and CSCE 
recognition of its peacekeeping efforts within the former Soviet Union. In 
September 1993, the Russian government suggested that the UN strategy of 
peacekeeping might need a revision. Kozyrev pointed out in a speech to the 
UN that in some instances, Russia was the only force capable of separating the 
fighting parties in the former Soviet Union. Recognizing that this interpretation 
did not coincide with standard UN peacekeeping practice, he argued that the 
UN needed to develop a general strategy of peace-making, and thus to accept 
the task of separating conflicting groups as well as simply preserving peace .~8 
Kozyrev proposed that the UN should codify regional cooperation in 
peacekeeping by relying on regional organizations to overcome conflicts within 
their particular parts of the world. Accordingly, as well as delegating tasks to 
NATO and the Western European Union (WEU), Russia and the CIS should 
be given a UN mandate to confront both conflicts and threats to human rights 
on the territory of the former Soviet Union. Russian leaders suggested that the 
UN should not only endorse Russia's current activities in the former Soviet 
Union, but also finance them. In this context, Kozyrev proposed the creation of 
a voluntary fund to support Russia's activities, since the UN was clearly unlikely 
to send troops to the CIS. These proposals are aimed to grant Russia 
international legitimacy for any military action within the former Soviet Union. 
52 
These initiatives reveal that the Russian military leadership wants to 
preserve most of the territory of the former Soviet Union as a collective defense 
space, for several reasons; 
First, the military is enthusiastic to maintain stability in Russia and in 
the Near Abroad taking the two as dependent issues. Second, they want to 
keep potential threats away from the Russian heartland and containing them 
on-site. Third, changing its old military bases and strategies may preempt too 
much effort and expense in the wake of shaky financial situation in Russia . 
Fourth, conservative forces in the military are unwilling to accept the break-up 
of the Soviet Union as a permanent case and by stationing troops abroad in 
their Near Abroad, they would be kept temporarily in good mood, perhaps 
preemting another coup. 
A protocol governing the use of CIS multinational peacekeeping 
forces in 'zones of inter ethnic conflict' was signed at Tashkent on July 16 
1992. The protocol permits the introduction of CIS peacekeeping forces upon 
the consensus of the CIS Council of Heads of State, at the request of one or 
more CIS member states, and with the consent of the parties engaged in the 
conflict. The UN Security Council and the CSCE will be notified if a 
peacekeeping operation is approved, and likely tasks could include 
establishing separation zones, demilitarized zones, and humanitarian corridors 
.
29 The permanent force, based on the UN Blue Helmets, would separate 
fighting elements, principally the numerous violent ethnic conflicts on Russia' s 
periphery. Russian nationalists, including former Vice President Alexander 
Rutskoi, have pressured Boris Yeltsin to protect the 30 million strong Russian 
people living in the Near Abroad. This agreement enables Yeltsin to act 
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collectively to restore peace without raising the intent of intervention by 
Moscow alone. 
After the disintegration of the USSR, Russia has become the only state 
that has a viable army, and the only one which can fulfill the peacekeeping role 
within the CIS. Russia is the leading military force in the CIS and is the sole 
post-Soviet nuclear power, de juro and de facto. Yet, Russia's ideas about 
peacekeeping efforts have also been described as neo-imperialism, and its 
efforts to give troops the status of CSCE blue helmets in zones of inter ethnic 
conflicts are interpreted as unconcealed attempts at new ' alterations' of the 
Eurasian continent. A London daily Independent even suggested that the offer 
of economic aid to Russia should be conditional upon Western restrictions on 
the intervention by Russian troops in the affairs of the Central Asian states. 
Russia's actions in neighboring countries are seen as " authoritarianism and 
chauvinism "3° even though inter ethnic conflicts along the perimeter of Russia's 
borders could have a direct effect on Russia's security interests. 
Creating a system of collective security that emphasizes peacemaking 
functions with a view of ensuring stability throughout the area of the former 
USSR, and developing effective mechanisms of prevention and settlement of 
military conflicts was framed by the Agreement on Groups of Military Observers 
and Collective Peacemaking Forces in the CIS, on 20 March, 1993. Protocols 
thereto as well as the Agreement on Collective Peacemaking Forces and Joint 
Measures for their Logistic Support followed on 24 September, 1993. 31 These 
agreements provide for CIS peacekeeping forces whose functions are similar to 
those of the UN, and are in conformity with the UN Charter. 
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The unstable situation in Central Asia has made the states ask for help 
first from Russia, seeing it as the unique power able to perform a real 
peacemaking role within the borders of the former USSR. Today, Russia is the 
only state to assume the task of conflict resolution in Central Asia. The risk of 
local and regional conflicts growing into large-scale ones are not seriously 
considered by the international community, so if Russia fails to deter these, it is 
inevitable that they will spread to neighborhood. The 20 March 1994 
Agreement of Collective Security foresees that the member states should come 
to each other's assistance if attacked and promised what one source termed a 
' tacit affirmation of the formation of separate armies by many states, including 
Russia and Ukraine. 32 It would also legitimize the stationing of Russian troops 
in the other republics and ultimately provide a broader use for Russia's nuclear 
arms. Official statutes of the pact were later approved by the CIS. 33 
Articles 1 and 4 of the collective security statement are as follows: 
If one of the participating states is subject to aggression by any state or 
group of states, this will be perceived as an aggression against all 
participating states to the treaty. In the event of an act of aggression being 
committed against any of the participating states will give it the necessary 
assistance, including military assistance, and will also give with the means 
at their disposal by way of exercising the right to collective defense in 
accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter. 34 
The Treaty on Collective Security established a Collective Security 
Council composed of the heads of state of signatory countries and the 
commander-in-chief of the CIS Joint Armed Forces. As a defensive alliance, 
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any real or perceived aggression against a member state is considered to be 
aggression against all, consistent with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. 
The Treaty certified the signatories' commitment to refrain from the use of force 
or threaten to use force, and it promised to treat all conflicts among them and 
with other states peacefully. In a tacit affirmation that the treaty will have a 
broader application than to the six new states, Article 1 observed that, should a 
system of collective security embracing all of Europe and Asia transpire, for 
which the contracting parties will strive unswervingly , 35 the signatories will take 
immediate steps to modify the treaty to accommodate the broader agreement. 
Marshal Shaposhnikov declared in an article in the Krasnaya Zvezda " Now 
there is a desire to create a new union on the basis of the Islamic factor in the 
South, incorporating the Central Asian states in the CIS. This could result in a 
new line of global confrontation on a North-South axis "36 A system of 
collective security for the Commonwealth states could act a stabilizing 
counterweight, and a kind of balance to these and other systems. The Treaty 
has defined the Southern borders of the CIS and defense within the jurisdiction 
of CIS armed forces. "We now have common external borders within the 
framework of the Commonwealth - land, air, and sea borders". declared 
General Leonid lvanshov. 37 Geostrategic interests of the Central Asian states 
are so intertwined that they cannot be unfastened where the interest of one 
state is a part of the interest of the other. The 'Treaty on Collective Security 
signed by Armenia Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, 
Azerbaijan, is significant in that has it initiated the process of creating a 
mechanism of 'conflict settlemenr in the region. 
The clearest example of peacekeeping by the Russian military since 
1991 has been in Tajikistan. When the Soviet Union collapsed, the Russians 
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had stayed on with the new government's consent, both to patrol the Tajik -
Afghan border and to help train forces. Russian leadership argued that Islamic 
fundamentalism might permeate further north if it were not stopped in Tajikistan 
and that they decided to intervene to stabilize the situation. Yet the 
peacemaking forces clearly backed one side in the crisis, leading to the victory 
of Islam Kerimov's forces over the opposition. Russia has left border troops 
along as many of the former Soviet frontiers as it can, and appears especially 
anxious to ensure that other states are denied access to its southern 
approaches through Central Asia and the Caucuses. 
Besides the Russian peacekeeping role in Central Asia , the 
presence of nuclear arms had ramifications for the Russian-Central Asian 
security relationship as a whole. Kazak President Nursultan Nazarbaev has 
been trying to extract the maximum out of the presence of nuclear arms on his 
territory although the presence of the weapons do not constitute a real 
deterrent, because their use is dependent on the authorization of Moscow, and 
they can not be retargeted by the Kazak technicians alone. Thus we can say 
that the Kazaks want more political than strategic and military gains from the 
presence of these weapons in that their presence is used to extract benefits 
from political calculations. The Russians, still in control of the nuclear weapons, 
have agreed to extend continued defense to Kazakhstan against third party 
threats. Otherwise, Nazarbaev might have turned to the Americans, removed 
the missiles from territory and invested politically in fundamentalist Islam. He 
might have also projected the role of independent Muslim Kazakhstan with 
nuclear power at hand. However, Kazakhstan acceded to the Non Proliferation 
Treaty (NPT) and accepted to eliminate strategic nuclear weapons on its 
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territory by 1997 as required by the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 
(START).38 
The bilateral agreements with Russia have been regulating the status 
of the former Soviet forces deployed in Central Asia, and the relationship of 
these forces to new national military units. These treaties clarify the status of 
the 40 th Army in Kazakhstan, 52 nd Army in Turkmenistan, and all divisions 
still deployed in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Kazak leader Nursultan 
Nazarbaev took the lead in signing the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and 
Mutual Assistance on 25 May 1992 39 The two agreed to form a united military 
and strategic zone and will jointly use this zone test sites and other military 
infrastructures. The treaty has been characterized by Yeltsin as a kind of 
political test site, verifying the philosophy of relations between newly 
independent states. 40 Yeltsin and Nazarbaev expressed their hope that the 
states of the Near Abroad take this Treaty as a model to be followed. The first 
experience in bilateral security within the CIS has also an additional 
significance, as it took place after the Ashkabad Summit in which Central 
Asian leaders as well as the leaders of Iran, Turkey and Pakistan contemplated 
an Asian bloc based on the geopolitics of the Southern Republics. The treaty 
with Kazakhstan was the beginning of Russia's Eurasian policies and 
regaining of some of the lost ground in the region. 
The 25 May 1992 Russo-Kazak Treaty stipulates the joint use and 
control of their airspace, and of the military bases and defense facilities located 
in both states and commits the two states to build up their defenses within a 
single military strategic zone on the basis of agreed military doctrines. 10 104 
SS-18 warhead silo-based ICBM's remain in Kazakhstan. Strategic nuclear 
58 
weapons and uranium mines and processing plants remain tightly under 
Russian control. 
Uzbekistan and Russia signed a Bilateral Treaty on 30 May 1992, on 
the " Fundamentals of Interstate Relations, Friendship and Cooperation " 
stipulating the joint use and control of their airspace, military bases and 
defense facilities, on the use of strategic installations, joint mobilization and 
joint Uzbek-Russian maneuvers. 41 In February 1993, a Russian military 
delegation headed by Pavel Grachev, Minister of Defense, met with Islam 
Kerimov, the Head of the State of Uzbekistan, to discuss the integration of the 
two states' positions in the sphere of military-technical cooperation, joint-
utilization of strategic facilities, and joint plans for combat mobilization, training, 
and military exercises of the Russian and Uzbek forces. This also points to the 
close military relationship between Russia and Uzbekistan and its possible 
development into one of the frameworks of security in Central Asia . 
The Tajik case is somewhat different ; the Tajiks have rejected a 
Turkmen-style double or joint command of troops with Russia, but signed a 
Friendship and Defense Treaty with Russia in May 1992 to develop joint armed 
forces with Russia in a common 'defense space'. The following April Treaty 
reaffirmed Russian role in providing military supplies and fixed the procedure 
for using Russian military installations on Tajik territory. Dependence on Russia 
is reinforced by the Russian peacekeeping role ,namely by the 201 st Motor -
Rifle Division stationed in Tajikistan, which is to form the basis for a planned 
CIS collective peacekeeping force of 5,000 troops. 
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Turkmen concerns reverting to a traditional role are assisted by the 
Russian focus on the insulation of its Southern borders from fundamentalist 
agitation routed from Afghanistan and Iran. Turkmen-Russian Treaties signed 
in July 1992, have turned Turkmenistan into a Russian military protectorate 
because, Turkmenistan is dependent on financial and material maintenance of 
the former Turkistan Military Divisions. According to the Treaty, the Turkmen 
forces will be trained and formed under direct Russian control. The Agreement 
of August 1992 also provides for a unified command of Turkmen-Russian 
border forces to protect Turkmen borders, which has freed Turkmenistan from a 
financial burden and strengthened Russia's position in the South. The political 
significance of Russia was described by Colonel 0. Falichev, military observer 
of Krasnaya Zvezda : "Turkmenistan is choosing Russia rather than any of its 
southern neighbors as guarantor of its security, its prosperity, and stability in 
the region". 42 Turkmenistan 's politico- military position will continue to reflect 
the two key realities and preoccupation of its post-Soviet times. 
First concern is the continuous and direct dependency on Russia for 
security of the new state vis a vis neighbors. And, secondly, the political desire 
and commitment to remain as independent as possible from Moscow and to 
avoid meaningful commitment in any regional politico-military bloc ( i.e. CIS ), 
which could wound its newly acquired independence, and could become a 
source of provocation and concern for its southern neighbors, especially Iran. 
Russia must balance its interests in formulating foreign policy 
towards Central Asia. The domestic situation in Russia and other sensitivities 
will guide the direction of Russian foreign policy formulations. The parameters 
of Russian foreign policy will depend on its resources and willingness to asseri 
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its position as a regional power with rights and interests reflecting its 
geographic proximity. 
The Tashkent Collective Security Agreement and the bilateral 
agreements have created an Asian-oriented security system around Russia 
with Kazakhstan being its key ally. Russia has become a guarantor of stability 
and security in a vast region, marked by a series of conflict zones on its 
southern borders. Some talk about a Monrovski doctrine for Russia as to its 
military, economic and political policies in Central Asia. But, some circles 
opposing the Eurasianist in Moscow, criticize the superabundance of military 
and economic activism in the territories of former Soviet Union, and emphasize 
the need to differentiate between core and peripheral interests, and the 
impossibility of acting as guardian over every Russian minority presence in the 
Near Abroad. 
To secure the continuing Russian military presence in the Near 
Abroad, Yeltsin on April 1994, sanctioned the military to begin negotiations to 
establish rights to maintain up to 30 military bases and facilities outside Russia. 
Accepting Russian minority assistance and cooperation with Russia on 
defense questions on the part of the Central Asians, is closely linked to the 
status of their economies. In the middle of a troublesome transition, they need 
to concentrate on economy more than military. Military agreements and 
arrangements between Central Asian Republics and Russia , will be a driving 
force of Russian involvement in Central Asia. But of course, more than 
anything, the economic situation and constraints on the part of Russia will be 
determining the limits of involvement. 
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3.3 Economic Interdependence 
The first years of the political transformation experience in Central Asia 
has proved to be only the beginning of a long process during which the 
sustainability of economic reforms and the effectiveness and efficiency of 
Western cooperation policies have proved to be the determinant factors for a 
successful integration of the Eurasian area to the international community of 
democratic countries . The legacy of the Soviet political heritage and the 
linkage between the negative effects of economic reforms, and the resurgence 
of nationalist or religious forces are the basic characteristics of the post-Soviet 
era. The new successor states were all established on the wreckage of the 
former Soviet Union with whom they were intertwined in language, institutions, 
currency, and way of life for 70 years. Economic dependence has been the 
primary fact that needs to be considered about these new successor states, 
and the first step before gaining real independence is the breaking of the 
chains of this well-entrenched economic dependence which has its origins at 
the communist empire. 
With the Economic Union Agreement signed on 18 October 1991 , 
barriers have been produced in the long-run to the agreements and 
engagements with other states , which foresaw the formation of an "economic 
grouping", 43 and stipulated the use of Ruble as the only medium of exchange, 
reserve, store of value for some time. It abolished of all taxes on the movement 
of goods and services within the Republics, including manipulation of the 
transfer of foreign currencies of third parties transferred in a way not to harm 
the monetary interests of the Union. The Republics were free to set up their 
own quotas, licenses etc. in their own economic relations. The agreement 
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brings about all conditions of dependency vis a vis banking, currency, foreign 
"exchange, which may further threaten the economic conditions of the 
successors. The successor states have many problems before economic 
independence: 
g_- Physical infrastructure: They lack modern rail, highway, and maritime 
connections, 
Q Ineptitude of communication facilities: Post, telegram, telex facsimile facilities 
are limited and backward in technology, 
c- Monetary infrastructure: The monetary infrastructure is backward, they lack 
qualified personnel, and modern system, 
g- Social infrastructure: They lack educated, trained human resources to 
conduct foreign economic relations. 
These inadequacies constitute the major barriers before real economic 
independence for the Central Asian Republics. As long as they can not solve 
these problems, real independence, will be a utopia for them in the coming 
years, and they will be open to Russian economic manipulations. Being part of 
a unified national economic complex of the former Soviet Union, Russia and 
Central Asia have been dependent on each other in many fundamental areas. 
This complex was formed as a system with elements that augment one another. 
Russia used the economic independence, of the former Soviet Union as a 
means to extend its influence throughout the CIS. The highly centralized nature 
of the Soviet economy meant that industries in different parts of the USSR 
depended on very distant sources of raw materials and parts often supplied by 
other republics. As the biggest republic and that with the most oil, gas and 
mineral deposits, Russia remains a crucial source of material for much of the 
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former Soviet Union. The Central Asian region on the other hand, is largely 
the source of a number of raw material resources that are either completely 
lacking in Russia or exist in ample quantities. The extremely large copper-
prophyr, pyrite and stratiform deposits of Central Asia and Transcaucasia lay 
beyond the borders of Russia . 44 Russia does not have significant reserves of 
copper, manganese, chromites, strontium ores, germanium, potassium, or 
potassium salts. Russia is the main buyer of cotton from Central Asia ( for 
Russia 's demand for 1.175. 700 tons, where Uzbekistan, alone provided 
544,000 tons). This list could easily be continued. Not only Russia depends on 
deliveries from the post-Soviet South, but other Central Asian countries are 
interested in them as well. Coal from the Kazakhstan Ekibastuz is intended for 
heating and electric power plants operating on the territory of Russia. The 
Karaganda Metallurgical Combine deliveries to Russia are about 2 million tons 
of rolled metal a year. The problem of selling these and other products will 
inevitably arise if exports to Russia are excluded. All these reveal that the 
formerly established links of the Soviet Union still hold on today. There are 
various forms of economic cooperation between Russia and post Soviet Central 
Asia within the framework of the CIS. An Economic Union of CIS States have 
been created, the Interstate Bank, Interstate Council on Questions of Industrial 
Policy have been instituted. 
But, one gets the impression that the Central Asian states, while not 
destroying economic ties with Russia, are trying to find alternatives to them, 
working within other organizational frameworks with states of the world to their 
South. 45 
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At the same time, Central Asians do not wish to remain inward looking 
is their foreign economic links, and have sought to participate in several 
initiatives like the Organization of Caspian States created in February 1992 by 
Iran, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Russia, where Russia was 
represented by its Ambassador to Iran where others were represented by 
higher states officers. Another example is the organization of Economic 
Cooperation (ECO) initiated by Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan in 1992. The final example is the 
institution of the BSEC Black Sea Economic Cooperation Zone initiated by 
Turkey in 1992, in which both Russia and a member of states interested in 
cooperation in the neighboring Central Asian region. 46 All roads previously 
passed through Moscow, but now the new states of the Region are looking for 
different roads, to reduce their dependence on Russia. 
The plans to create new transportation communications (railroads, 
highways, and pipelines) are visible signs of future trends in economic 
cooperation. The building of communications routes tells us considerably more 
than serious agreements and widely announced declarations. Previously, all 
roads to the East passed through Moscow, but now the new states of the region 
are looking for different roads, which very frequently avoid Russia. The 
Commission of European Communities (CEC), which is oriented toward the 
creation of a combined transportation corridor from Europe, to Caucuses and , 
Asia is very attractive to the Central Asian states. The main route would bypass 
Russia along the line of Almat1-Ashkabad-Turkmenbashi- Baku- Poti - Batumi. 
Each Central Asian state is trying hard to create its own transportation access 
to communication centers of global significance. Thus Kazakhstan, having 
established rail communication long the road of Almat1- Beijing, intends to 
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extend this route to the territories of Turkmenistan, Iran and Turkey in order to 
reach Western Europe. Turkmenistan is speeding up the construction of the 
railroad route of Tedzhen-Seraks- Maskhad, which will make it possible to link 
this Central Asian countries to Tehran, Ankara, and West Europe. Iranian 
territory, with renewed communications in the interests of Turkmenistan, will 
become for the latter a kind of bridge to the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. 
Through Kazakhstan, which is joined by railroad to China, it is also possible to 
gain access to the Far East - the Asia- Pacific region. 47 
Intra-trade constitutes the major section of the successor states trade 
division, where Russia has the greatest share that proves the aforesaid 
interdependent economic network. On economic terms, the richness of its 
natural resources is the most important characteristic of the Central Asian area. 
Especially when the energy oriented natural resources are considered, it 
seems that the Central Asian region will have an important role to play as a 
strategic energy supplier on the world stage. Despite some industrial 
development in the post-World War II era, these republics maintain a 
principally rural and agrarian economy. Agriculture represents %40 of the net 
material output linked to the agricultural sector. The high degree of 
specialization in the agricultural sector has rendered the economy heavily 
dependent on food exports. The economic activities have been dominated by 
the public sector which employed about three fourths of the labor force. These 
republics have all became members of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
and the World Bank, the primary financial institutions of the world. After 
independence, they seek harmonization with other states , blocks and 
organizations and demand credits for their restructuring. 
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For example, the decision to raise its oil and gas prices closer to 
world prices exacerbated supply problems in the former Soviet Union, and 
caused several republics to be in debt to Russia, since no alternative source of 
affordable fuel was available. This dependence may give Russia a vital 
leverage over both economic and political choices and decisions in the former 
Soviet Union. First of all, through the subsidies it has been giving since the 
times of the USSR it has been able to establish a control mechanism over the 
economic policies of the former Soviet Union states. Second, the ruble was 
used to preserve the economic ties with the former Soviet Union states. By late 
1993, Russia appeared very willing to exploit its economic leverage to obtain 
political and economic concessions from the other former Soviet Union states. 
Russia's economic policy towards the CIS does not appear to be based on a 
pragmatic recognition of its own long-term interests. There is mutual economic 
dependence, though to a lesser degree on Russia's part. Russia has little to 
offer on the international market, save raw materials. To sustain its position, as 
a major power, it must pause, and then, reverse economic calamities in 
Kazakhstan or elsewhere in the CIS. 48 During the bitter currency dispute at the 
end of 1993, President Kerimov of Uzbekistan warned Russia that it risked 
losing the Uzbek market. If Central Asia can achieve economic success in the 
long-term, the threat may carry weight. But for the moment, the Republics need 
Russia more than Russia needs them. President Akaev of Kyrgyzstan said in 
June that the volume of Kyrgyz trade with Russia had not slipped below that 
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. The meager supply situation in Kyrgyzstan means 
that this is not a cause for celebration. 49 Akaev called for a Russian-Kyrgyz 
trading house to be set up with the aim of reversing the decline. In January 
1994, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan agreed to create their own "Economic Area" 
with the agreement that stipulated the free circulation of goods, services, and 
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capital and establishment of co-ordinated policies for credit and finance, 
budget, tax, customs duties and currency from now until the year 2000. On 
February 1994, Kyrgyzstan joined the two in establishing a tripartite economic 
union with the aim of loosening ties with Russia . so 
The Economic Union agreement involves the coordination of 
commercial, monetary and labor policies. It would create a region larger than 
Western Europe with a combined 48 millions of population, possessing as 
much oil and mineral wealth as the Gulf. The participating countries will 
abolish customs procedures and tariffs in order to revitalize the regional trade 
and to create a better economic environment for foreign investors. The Uzbek -
Kazak-Kyrgyz agreement from the beginning of the year, lifting taxes on trade 
between the Republics, was reaffirmed by the Presidents during their summit at 
lss1k-Kol in Kyrgyzstan on 30 April 1994. Prices tor sugar and alcoholic drinks 
have also fallen. Increased rail services between Tashkent and Cambul have 
enabled more cross-border shopping trips. But, it remains to be seen whether 
the accord will significantly increase in overall trade between the Republics. 51 
The tripartite agreement cannot solve Kazakhstan's problem with over-
production of numerous commodities, which used to be dispatched to Russia, 
but which have now been replaced by Russian domestic production. 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan have started to 
integrate their economies into the international trade system while Tajikistan 
has not developed significant foreign trade capacities because of military 
conflicts in which it is involved and because of its meager natural resources. f.2 
Kazakhstan is and will be the major trading partner of Russia as the result of 
the economic interdependence system left over from the Soviet era and 
because of the large ethnic Russian presence in Kazakhstan and 
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geographical proximity. Although it has a more developed industry than the 
other Central Asian republics, it has been completely dependent on Moscow 
and other Central Asian republics for subsidies and imports. Kazakhstan's main 
foreign trade comes from the exports of both ferrous and non-ferrous metals. In 
the future, with its rich natural resources and rational progress towards a free 
market economy, Kazakhstan is likely to develop a competitive export market at 
both the regional and global levels. 
The inter-trade traditionally takes up a large space of Uzbekistan's 
foreign trade transactions. Speaking in terms of 1991 figures % 87,4 of 
Uzbekistan's total exportation and % 81 of its total importation were engaged 
with the states of the former USSR. However, the disruptions that occurred in 
inter-republican trade in 1991, resulted in an elimination of Uzbekistan's inter-
republican trade deficit and a shift toward foreign and barter trade. In 1989 and 
1990, the annual deficits in inter-republican trade were recorded to be around 
3.5 billion rubles (11.4% of the GDP ) In 1991, Uzbekistan's imports fell due to 
difficulties in supplies coming from other states, and exports surged in ruble 
terms from price adjustments, which resulted in a surplus in the inter-republican 
trade balance. Difficulties experienced in delivering products, especially 
foodstuff to Uzbekistan by other states of the CIS, forced the Uzbek 
government to increase imports from outside the former USSR. This 
transformation in inter-republican trade's character, with the new trend towards 
the use of international prices in the inter- republican trade led to a sharp 
increase in barter trade, such as cotton for food grains. s3 Compared with other 
former Soviet Republics, this republic has been even more dependent upon 
inter-republican, rather than foreign trade- links. Today it is struggling for 
economic independence, especially from Moscow. 
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Due to the considerable degree of sectoral specialization of output 
among the republics of the former USSR, and the relatively small size of the 
domestic economy, Kyrgyzstan has had high ratios of exports and imports to 
gross domestic product (GDP). In 1990, an estimated 98 % of total exports and 
73% of total imports were engaged in inter-republican trade. To overcome this 
problem, Kyrgyz President Akaev has aimed to turn the agriculture based 
economy into a manufacturing one by focusing on light industries and 
microelectronics. Kyrgyzstan is heavily dependent on other CIS Republics for 
imports which are essential for its economic production structures. Its main 
inter-republican imports are oil and gas supplies, ferrous metals, chemicals 
pharmaceuticals, certain engineering products, wood and paper products, a 
variety of foodstuffs and most construction materials other than cement. Its 
foreign imports have been primarily consumer goods, such as foodstuffs, 
chemicals, clothing and engineering products. Krgyzstan's main exports to 
other CIS countries are non-ferrous metals, woolen products, agricultural and 
food products, electric power, electronic goods and selected engineering 
products. In 1992, Krgyzstan's exports to the CIS countries was 67.3 million 
rubles, where its exports outside the CIS was 3.3 million Rubles. Krygyztan's 
exports to the CIS was 46.3 million Rubles where exports outside the CIS 
amounted to 6.5 million Rubles , which once again reveal the oft-cited 
dependence on Russia and the other CIS states. 
Turkmenistan has been completely dependent on Moscow and other 
regions for subsidies and imports of food and textiles. The large degree of 
specialization in the agricultural sector has rendered the economy heavily 
dependent on food imports. For example, Turkmenistan exports 65% of its 
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grain consumption, 45% of its milk and dairy products, 70% of its potatoes and 
all its sugar. Turkmenistan exports more than 95% of the cotton and gas 1t 
produces, as well as 70% of its silk to other Soviet republics at artificially low 
prices although economic reforms have increased prices to some degree. 
The end of the Soviet Union also meant the end of subsidies for Central 
Asia. 54 As can be seen in Table 4, the subsidies represent around 20% of the 
gross domestic product of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. 
Despite the vast natural resources of the region, oil and gas in 
Turkmenistan, oil, aluminum and coal and chrome in Kazakhstan, gold in 
Uzbekistan, and uranium in Tajikistan, Central Asia has been the most 
impoverished region of the former Soviet Union. The Central Asians think the 
reason behind this is the over-centralized Soviet-economy, while the Russians 
put the blame on high birth rate. 55 Uneven industrial development in the 1960s 
and 1970s created an economic depression in most of Central Asia that was 
exacerbated by Gorbachev's economic reforms. 
Economic links constitute the strongest link between the Central 
Asians and the Russian Federation. The Soviet economic policy in Central Asia 
had followed a classical imperialist logic. Central Asia was an integrated part of 
the overall Soviet system, primarily supplying raw materials for processing in 
the industrial centers of the European and Western Siberian parts of the Soviet 
Union. Russia today is trying to make use of this highly centralized nature of 
the former Soviet economy to extend its influence throughout the CIS. 
Increasing the prices of oil and gas prices closer to world prices, has made the 
Central Asia indebted to Russia, which in return, provided Russia with a 
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significant economic and political leverage over them. Russia was subsidizing 
all of Central Asia in the times of the USSR, and now too it is exerting pressure 
and influence over them. 
The Central Asian Republics are better off than other former USSR 
republics thanks to the possession of raw materials which gives them greater 
potential to survive as independent states. However, due to the maldistribution 
of transportation network of the former Soviet Union, all the major oil pipelines 
and railway lines run through Russia and moreover, Russia objects to other 
alternative routes for the export of oil and gas. Another tool used by Moscow to 
exert control over Central Asia economies was the ruble. The institution of the 
Ruble Zone proceeded, but because there were some states which did not 
share the burden of economic reform, Russians issued new rubles in summer 
1993. Policy differences caused further problems because of different 
strategies of reform which resulted in inflation throughout the CIS. By 1993 in 
attempt to prevent this, Russia issued new rubles in July and then tightened 
requirements for continued use of the ruble by other republics which forced 
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to withdraw from the Ruble Zone and new 
currencies were introduced by late 1993. Kazakhstan issued "Tenge", 
Uzbekistan "Som", Turkmenistan "Manat", Kyrgyzstan "Som", Tajikistan 
"Soman". Expanding the ruble zone was not in Russian interests because they 
did not have control over money supply, subsidies, yet it was maintained to 
extend Russia's authority in the former republics, regardless of the economic 
costs involved. 
It is unrealistic to expect that the Soviet economic dependence be 
reversed overnight. It is only possible in the medium term, building a trading 
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infrastructure with new countries and to produce competitive goods to wor1j 
markets. Thus, to avoid the total collapse of the trading system between th~ 
Central Asian Republics and Russia, it is essential that the former trading links 
and networks be preserved for the time being . However, the Central Asia1 
states are in a advantageous position due to the possession of some strategi: 
raw materials. For example, large hydrocarbon deposits lie in a sedimentar1 
line that extends from the North Caucuses to the Tajik-Afghan border . 56 
Turkmenistan has vast reserves of gas, while Kazakhstan has 
large undeveloped oil reserves around the Caspian Sea, and substantial coal 
and other metal and mineral deposits. Uzbekistan is not as lucky as the twJ 
above, but it has 60 tons of annual output capacity of gold. Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan are the poorest who are dependent on foreign sources for energy 
supply. Those Republics which are dependent on Russia for the supply of 
energy and other essential raw materials to develop their industry, will find :t 
rather difficult to replace Russia as their major trading partner. 
The economic interdependence among the Central Asian states and 
Russia is an undeniable fact of the general framework of relations between 
them. The new economic systems developed in the Central Asian States 
provide new alternatives other than Russia for them. New trade partners are 
on the stage, new national currencies have been issued, new transportation 
links are being developed and new industrial plants being built to reduce the 
formerly established centralized economic network of the former Soviet Union, 
yet it is unrealistic to expect that the economic dependence among them be 
reversed overnight . Due to the unique economic peculiarities between the 
Central Asian Republics and the Russian Federation, it is predestined that a 
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close and coordinated relationship is to continue at least for some two decades 
to come. 
As the Soviet system had imposed on the Central Asian States a 
heavily-centralized and interdependent system, they have been closed to tha 
outside with an "Iron Curtain". The primary action of Central Asian States in the 
field of economy should be to move from this Iron Curtain, to another system 
which will be determined by global market forces. Their trading pattern has 
been changing through involving increase in direct-investment , private loans 
and official assistance. They are also promulgating foreign investment laws to 
encourage joint-ventures while eager to maintain good relations with 
international organizations demanding stand-by agreements , rehabilitation 
loans and project -financing . 
However, economic ties and strategic interests are not the only ties 
that the Russian Federation maintains towards Central Asia . Concerns with 
potential Islamic fundamentalism also shapes foreign policy. 
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2.4 ISLAM: myth or reality in Central Asia ?: a strong parameter influencing 
Russian foreign policy -making in Central Asia 
The disintegration of the USSR , not only turned the five Central 
Asian Republics into independent states, but also transformed Islam from a 
faith of the minority to one of the majority faith. The fact, that religion can 
serve as a strong component of political identity, like nationalism ,has led to 
its analysis as a salient feature of foreign policy in modern international 
relations. 
The collapse of the USSR had raised fear among the international 
community and Russians that the strategic and political vacuum created by 
the collapse of the communist ideology and the disintegration of the of USSR 
will either be filled by Iran or Turkey no matter how speculative. The Russian 
Federation from the start declared Islamic fundamentalism as the major threat 
to its territorial integrity and stability. The fact that the Iranian move could 
expose Central Asia to Islamic fundamentalism mobilized Russia, and resulted 
in the Western support to back Turkey. Central Asia was projected as a 
battleground of a new "Great Game ", Turkey on the one hand represented by 
Kemalist secularism and Iran represented by Islamic fundamentalism on the 
other. 
The 1990s have been the years when radical political Islam has 
gained pace in the international system. The end of the Cold War bipolarity has 
provided greater maneuverability for states and the message of reform and 
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renewal of Islam has attracted popular support, filling an ideological gap after 
the collapse of Communist ideology. Ever since the Muscovite dominance, 
Russia has tended to view the southern Muslim world as a threat to the security 
and integrity of the Russian state. After the disintegration of the USSR, Russian 
foreign policy makers wanted to formulate policies to bar the advent of Turkic 
nationalism and Islamic fundamentalism, so that these would not harm the 
integrity and stability of the Russian state. 
Islam is increasingly becoming a defining force in evolving political 
agendas of the international system. How Islam has been and and is being 
reshaped in the face of social, political, and economic change, and how 
religious identities cross-cut national identities remain to be fully understood 
especially in the case of Central Asian states where one can never talk about 
a homogeneous concept of Islam. The new burst of activism has reached such 
proportions that, with the demise of communism, more and more people are 
turning to Islam as an identity reference, and they have been holding religion 
as a source of transformation. s7 Islam has been and continues to be a source of 
identity among the Muslims of Central Asia. Many members of the major 
nationalities of that region do not differentiate between being a Muslim and 
belonging to their particular nationality. National customs are viewed as Islamic 
and Islamic traditions are viewed as national traditions. Even people who are 
not religious in a spritual sense are said to participate in Islamic rituals, 
because these are seen as expressions of membership in the nationality. The 
strength of the Islamic component of national identity in Central Asia does not 
always bring with it a strong sense of belonging to a broader, supranational 
Islamic Community, however, which is a hypothetical formation in any event. In 
Central Asia, traditional Islamic rituals such as circumcision, funerals, or the 
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observance of Ramadan have been important cultural expressions of Muslim 
identity distinguishing the Muslims from the Slavs .. The oft-cited "homoislamicus 
- homosovieticus "distinction was a consequence of this process. 
The new successor states in Central Asia are about to rediscover 
the roots of their identity where religion was considered as one of the 
strongest identity references. There is a fear among the Russians and the West 
that the brand of Islam involved would be of the extremist type, originating frorn 
Iranian activities. Nevertheless, this development can not be attributed to 
Iranian activities. It could have happened with or without an Islamic Iran 
especially when one considers the Shiite-Sunni gap : the Muslims of Central 
Asia are different from the Iranians in that, they are predominantly Sunni. In 
Shiism, the clergy are empowered to moderate between God and man, thus the 
mullahs and ayatollahs have important leadership roles in interpreting God's 
will to the faithful. Among the Sunni, man's relationship with God is direct and 
the clergy serve as advisors. Another point is that there has been no change in 
the bureaucratic structure of these states: they are still governed by the same 
elites of the former Soviet system and bureacratic infrastructures have not 
changed. Moreover, on the one hand, there is a difference between desiring a 
society with Islam playing a more prominent role, and on the other hand, trying 
.to establish a polity based on a militant and extremist interpretation of Islam. 
:The leaders of these states make it clear that despite their desire for an Islamic 
!type of polity, they have no wish to imitate lran.sa Second, clerical 
iestablishment in these states are neither so established nor are they 
I 
:supported by religious endowments and individual donations which constitute 
1an inhibiting factor before the development of the radical brand of Islam. Third, 
I 
even if these states were to rely on Islam as the conceptual and ideological 
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underpinning of their new societies and polities, it is unlikely that their Islam 
would be of the militant brand like it is in Iran. Finally, after 70 years of Soviet 
domination which inflicted severe damage on the heritage of an integrated 
religious system, it is difficult to expect Central Asia to fall into the integrative 
potential of Muslim world-religion which has never been homogeneous or ever 
will be. 
Islam may play an important role in the dramatic changes effecting 
contemporary Central Asia in that it provides an underpinning for a culture that 
until the late 1920s regarded itselves as wholly Muslim, There is a heritage 
created by the atheist USSR and the Islamic civilization, which may find a 
synthesis in secular Islam. 
"Russia has grown up with the struggle against Islam", said the 
Hungarian Orientalist Vambery in 1875, and Russia is the one and only power 
which has inflicted considerable wounds upon Islam and which will remain 
Islam's dangerous opponent, untiring in the work which it has begun. 59. State--
organized atheism forced the people to get away from their religion. The Sovi8t 
struggle against Islam was very careful, the political target was well-defined: to 
bring all the Muslims under the rule of Russian Communism. They pursued 
policies-movements of Islamic content. To propagate Communist politics 
among the Muslims, "The Commissariat for Muslim Affairs" came into being, 
under the leadership of Molla Nur Vahidov. The Soviet government of Russia 
founded a "Militant Atheists Society" in Turkistan in 1926, under the leadership 
of Nasir Torekul. On April 1929, the Act concerning the religious communities, 
referring to the obligation to register themselves and setting out the rules for 
the practice of religious duties was passed. The radical struggle against Islam 
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forced the Muslims to keep their religious duties at the minimum possibla 
personal level. The communists had made it a part of their strategy to 
encourage their Atheist Movement to slander Islam, and to reject Allah, tha 
Prophets and the Koran. The mere fact that the Muslims have had no mosques, 
literature, no trained clergy, no freedom to express their faith, represent the 
success of the communists. During the Second World War, the Soviet Union 
was forced to consent to the establishment of administrative bodies for all the 
religions in the USSR. Certainly, Muslims tried in various ways to keep Islam 
alive, under the conditions of Communist rule. The Russians wanted to develop 
the sense of homosovieticus against homoislamicus seeing Islam dangerous t,J 
Slavic integrity in the Soviet Union. Some say that the repression of religioil 
only pushed it underground where some believe that latent forces of Islam 
merely wait to burst out at first chance to dominate the thinking and life of the 
area once again. There has been atheist rule for a long time and they were 
dependent on the Slavic poeple who were afraid of a Muslim block. The Central 
Asian people yet, are neither in need of a communist nor an Islamic Revolution, 
because living independence after long years of domination is something very 
precious for them . 
The challenge offered by Islamic parties to secular regimes has 
transnational potential because, Central Asia has a cultural unity that 
transcendent national boundaries, ethnic groups and political organizations, 
and cuts across national boundaries where Islam is the only common 
denominator. The Islamic Revival Party for example, operates ,in Tajikistan and 
Uzbekistan. Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP) which has been banned by all 
five Central Asian Republics calls for the overthrow of communism and the 
establishment of the republics as Islamic Republics, and it foresees religious 
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extremism. Uzbekistan has outlawed all religious parties and any attempt by< 
the clergy to bid for ruling through the Parliament. The spokesman of IRF-
Abdullah Yusuf said: 
When Western people talk about Islam, they talk about it being 
fanatic, and they use the term "fundamentalist", I'd like to emphasize one 
thing: we cannot draw a parallel with the Iranian society. There is a great 
difference between Shia and Sunni sects of Islam. The spiritual leader who 
will be a chief of state here should not only be a member of the clergy, he 
has to know secular sciences-Pakistan is a more suitable model for us, 
what we want is a democracy of our own-an Islamic democracy, although 
all the elements of democracy are in Islam, so we don't need to add the 
word. With our people, the notion of democracy means no restrictions, 59 
Yusuf added that it would not be a one party state, the franchise would be 
universal, the rights of minorities and ethnic groups will be protected, and 
private property would be honored. But "Anti-Islamic" practices, for example, 
would be forbidden. oo 
Of all the Central Asian Republics, Tajikistan is the place where 
nationalist and religious forces have come together - an unofficial alliance that 
could shape any third attempt to end communist rule. Religious leader Quzi 
said: " There is a great deal of unity here, our people home believed in Islam 
for 130 years " 61 . And Islam is 90% of the Central Asian culture and tradition, 
so one can not separate something religious from something national. But, 
some people do not want an Islamic state because, they have lived a long time 
with atheism, they are interdependent with the Slavic republics and they do 
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not ever want Islamic states round them. Quzi continued, " We don't want the 
same thing to happen to the Islamic revolution that happened to the communist 
revolution.62 " Since, Tajiks need economic assistance, outside help and the 
international institutions will resist such an idea of Islamic state, the West 
should never expect the repetition of the Iranian revolution in Tajikistan . 
Though, Islam will play a strategic role in the shaping of the 
region's transition to post-Soviet balances .. Tajiks encourage the trend of 
having closer relations with Iran and Afghanistan with which they share a 
thousand years of history being against the idea of creating a new Turkistan, 
they do not want to be liberated from Russian domination only to be dictated by 
another group. 
Russian policy-makers fear that the influence of Iran, Pakistan and 
Afghanistan is bound to grow somewhat on the Central Asian states : where 
fundamentalism is either a strong political force (Pakistan) or is the ruling 
ideology (Iran). With the extinction of the communist ideology, Islam or its 
fundamentalist variant may become a powerful political force to a lesser degree 
in Central Asia, but more so in Tajikistan. Popular discontent, instability and 
economic crisis may enhance the charm of militant and fundamentalist Islam. 
The Islamic Renaissance Party asserts that the present-day ruling parties are 
remains of the communist regime and they cannot represent the people. With 
the ideological vacuum, the Islamic opposition created especially in Uzbekistan 
and Tajikistan wings of the Islamic Revival Party, and religious figures like Qazi 
Akbar Torecanzade of Tajikistan, have been using the concepts of Islam to 
attack the regimes based in the central and eastern mountainous regions. In 
the Fergana Valley, traditionally a tower of Islam, which traverses Uzbekistan, 
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Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, the connection between economic hardship and th-3 
strength of Islam is similarly clear. It is manifested by the incontestable 
popularity of ideas rooted in the vision of the society that incorporates lslami: 
values in its identity, politics and system of justice.57 
Central Asians are inheritors of a glorious Islamic past, and today 
mosques are spreading everywhere as are religious schools after years of 
oppression of Islam . With the demise of Soviet institutions, ideology and the 
persistence of economic crises, Islam could become a powerful force in Central 
Asia where with independence, came an inevitable religious revival. Overnight 
Islam became a common denominator, a powerful vehicle for asserting identity. 
People instinctively felt that it was Islam which is not merely a set of religious 
beliefs, but a way of life and civilization that made them different from the 
Russians. Now overtly calling themselves Muslims, and asserting their Islamic 
identity, they have found at last what makes a community distinct from all 
others in former Soviet Republics (The oft-cited homoislamicus-
homosovieticus distinction). The Islamic ideology embodies the ideas of 
nationalism and sovereignty initself. 58 Thus, it is indisputable that , Islam is 
going to be an issue worth serious consideration in Central Asia for strategists 
after the Cold-War. 
Today, Islam may emerge as a barrier against extended Russian 
role in Central Asia where Islam is becoming a defining item of the political 
agenda in that it helps the people distinguish themselves from the Slavs, and 
helps them unite within a system which it foresees as total way of life. In the 
Tajik case for example, the consolidation of a radical lslamist opposition 
during the crisis in 1992, revealed that lslamist groups had suppressed the 
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nationalist political groupings in the new political order . The Tajik case is a 
clear example of how Russia considers the Near Abroad, and how sensitive it 
is about the rising role of Islam albeit in that it would clearly have an Iranian 
dimension in this case in Central Asia. The danger of the crisis in Tajikistan 
raised fears in Russia that it may become the carbon copy of the Afghan War. 
Thus securing the southern borders became imperative. Russia calculated that 
if Tajikistan turned into an Islamic state, it would lead to the further penetration 
of Islamic fundamentalism into the North. Despite the bad memories of the 
Afghan War, the Russian involvement proves how serious they take the 
"Islamic factor " in the Near Abroad and especially in Tajikistan . The Russian 
devotion to the Tajik crisis also reveals the ascendance of the Eurasianists to 
power and the reintegration of the Near Abroad to the context foreign policy. 
The crisis in 1992 justifies Russian worries of external intrusion. Allen 
Hetmanek 61 argues in a case study recently made, that Islamic resurgence in 
Tajikistan originating in late 1970 was mobilized by the Iranian Revolution. 
The Atlanticists and Islam : They contemplate that ethno-religious conflicts 
may jeopardize the security of 30 million ethnic Russians living in the Near 
Abroad and may necessitate Russian intervention. The potential spread of 
Islamic radicalism in Central Asia is connected to political and security 
dynamics of the former southern flank, and thus its security and defense 
preoccupies a significant place in the Euro-Atlanticist view. Europeans and the 
Atlanticist have the same views about an Islamic threat, and thus, the Russians 
may form the front line against a perceived Islamic threat. However, it is not 
possible to talk about a homogeneous Islam in Central Asia and in the world at 
large. They argue that due to the congruence of interest, the West will delegate 
power to Russia to contain the Islamic threat on behalf of the Western world. 
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Russia will forget-disguise its Eastern image and lead Central Asia to the path 
of civilized world, towards a strong security relationship with the West. 62 Yet, 
in December 1994, Russia declared that it was not adhering to the Partnership 
for Peace negotiations which portrays Russian devotion to this end. 
Islam and the Eurasianists: Russian foreign policy must secure both internal 
and external borders of the CIS and good ties with the Southern flank are a 
must. The stability of Central Asia preserves a pivotal role as their security 
conditions the overall security of Russia. Russia's interests will be undermined 
with overlapping ethno-territorial nationalism where conflicts may provoke the 
Russian minority population. A vulnerable South may invite Iran, Pakistan, and 
Afghanistan, thus a strong integrated process in Central Asia and an activist 
Russian foreign policy is a primary necessity. First, they argue that Islam shall 
not be opposed totally and must not lead to the wholesale opposition and 
hostility. Islam and the Islamic world must be presented as a legitimate security 
concern. Proximity to the Muslim world is determining Russia's geopolitical 
position and diversifies its international relations. Secondly, Russia shall not 
cooperate with the West to contain Islam, the Russian Federation has its own 
Muslim minority population: its inner abroad and its geopolitical continuity with 
the Islamic world. Russia has always been afraid of being encircled by an 
Islamic -Turkic world, still the Russians look at their South as a potential friend 
necessary ·for their security and stability and also to counterbalance the 
Western world. Russia has the reconciling role in bridging together the Turkic 
and Muslim elements in that ,Russia has always been a mixture of Slavic 
Turkic components, of Orthodoxy and Islam. Russia seems to keep the 
persistence and influence of Islam within manageable limits and reduce it if 
possible . Russia, through the mass media, and other means, tried to deter 
84 
people from practicing Islam and direct the population towards atheism in the 
past. The Eurasianists think that a too vigorous anti-Islamic propaganda would 
be counterproductive. The philosophy of the Eurasianist School is the 
dominant approach towards Islam today in Central Asia. 
3.4.3 The Tajik Case : 
The T ajik crisis is a useful example to portray how Russia considers its 
Near Abroad in the context of the Eurasianist school of foreign policy . The 
danger of escalation of the crisis in Tajikistan caused fears in Russia that 1t 
may become a carboncopy of the Afghan War, thus securing the Southern 
borders became imperative. Russia calculated that if Tajikistan turned into an 
Islamic state, it would lead to the further penetration of Islamic fundamentalism 
into the North. 
The crisis in Tajikistan has dominated the political agenda of the newly 
independent states of Central Asia, but also has also done the most to 
energize Russia's strategic policy towards the region within the context of the 
Eurasianist school. At the beginning, until the escalation of the conflict in 1992, 
the Russian involvement was limited; they considered it as a intra-clan conflict 
and there were no vital Russian interests in Tajikistan to justify any Russian 
involvement. Moreover, the memory of Afghanistan had reduced the desire to 
intervene. The 201 st motor rifle division which was left in Tajikistan after the 
disintegration of the USSR, was ordered to remain neutral. Russian foreign 
policy makers began to show greater concern about the Tajik conflict by late 
1992. The vulnerability of the Tajik regime to Mujahideen influence and border 
penetration increasingly captured the attention of both Moscow and especially 
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the Central Asian states. The appeals from the Central Asian leaders and the 
warnings from the international community about the consequences of the 
refusal of fulfilling its obligations of maintaining stability has mobilized Russian 
policy makers. Islam Kerimov, President of Uzbekistan, for example said; "If 
Russia fails to understand her strategic interests in Central Asia, then her 
southern borders will face directly onto Islamic Countries".63 Kerimov wanted to 
underline that unless Russia defended the Southern borders of the CIS, 
maintained pro-Russian elites in power in the region, and prevented 
encroachments of the Afghan Mujahideen and Iranian fundamentalists, then 
Central Asia would be engulfed by the Islamic fundamentalism and present 
Russia with a highly explosive strategic threat on its southern borders. Russian 
Defense Minister, Pavel Grachev, argued that if Tajikistan turned into an 
Islamic state, it would lead to the further penetration of Islamic fundamentalism 
into the North, -Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and further with potentially dangerous 
consequences for Russia.6s In September 1992. The 201st division was 
strengthened, and plans were designed to send the CIS peacekeeping force to 
Tajikistan which consisted of units from Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and 
Kazakhstan. 
The Uzbek-Russian mediators conferred legitimacy upon the new Tajik 
government elected in November 1992, which was dominated by the traditional 
power elites. In late December, the Russian 201 st division participated in the 
new Tajik government's ousting of the Democrat-lslamist opposition from 
Dushanbe into the Pamir mountains and Afghanistan. By the beginning of 
1993, Russia had restored the old political order in Tajikistan, supporting one 
side in the conflict against the other. However, some circles in Russian public 
opinion feared that the defeat of the opposition by military means, could drag 
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Russia into an Afghan-style guerrilla war, and that Russia could only avoid this 
outcome by sponsoring a political dialogue between different factions and 
groups in Tajik society. These were confirmed by an attack on the Russian post 
at the Afghan - Tajik border on July 14 1993, which resulted in the deaths of 
more than 20 Russian soldiers, and forced the Russians to take a more 
discriminating approach towards the Tajik conflict.66 
On 7 August 1993, Yeltsin convened a Russian-Central Asian Summit 
in Moscow where the outlines of the new Russian foreign policy were 
developed. First, Yeltsin made it clear that all Central Asian states would have 
to cooperate with Russia in resolving the Tajik problem, and that Russia was 
unwilling to shoulder the whole burden. Second, Yeltsin emphasized to the 
Tajik leadership that it could not expect continued Russian support unless it 
agreed to engage in a direct dialogue with all sections of the opposition. Third, 
the Foreign Ministers of all the countries signed a letter to the UN Secretary 
General, requesting UN observers to be sent to Tajikistan. The August Summit 
reflected a new approach on the part of the Russian foreign policy to the Tajik 
crisis. The dominance of the Eurasianist school was felt and, Moscow virtually 
admitted that its one sided support for the traditional elite and its reliance on 
military suppression of the opposition had been counter-productive. The 
Summit set out the framework for a more permanent political solution to the 
Tajik civil war. The majority of the Russian public opinion was against Russian 
withdrawal from Tajikistan. The absence of a clear mandate for Russian 
involvement in the affairs of Central Asia has led Russian policy-makers to 
attempt to fasten ties with regional powers, who might be able to share some 
of the responsibilities for maintaining regional stability. Uzbekistan has been 
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Russia's best partner in cooperation in Central Asia. On May 1993, an 
Agreement was signed between the Chairman of Supreme Council of 
Tajikistan, imamali Rahmanov, and the President of Russian Federation Boris 
Yeltsin on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Aid. In the meantime, a package 
of seven documents were signed providing for Tajik and Russian forces to 
cooperate militarily, economically, and in defense of state borders, which has 
critical strategic and political implications for both states and for the other 
states of Central Asia. The Agreement between the two states stipulates a joint 
policy on defense and military technology, including financing military programs 
and buying arms. If an act of aggression is committed against one of the parties 
to the Agreement, the other will offer assistance. The article points out that the 
Agreement provides for the keeping Russian armed forces on the territory of 
Tajikistan for a transitional period 67, and it focuses on the border problems. 
The Agreement mentions a transitional period until Tajikistan has its own 
border troops, and it is delegating the right to ward its borders and those of 
Russia and the CIS, to Russian border troops. After the deaths of 60,000 and 
the mass departure of 250,000 people from the area of conflict, the signing of 
the Agreement provided a relief from the disaster. The damage inflicted over 
the Tajik economy and transport is about 350 million rubles. During the 
negotiations of the Agreement, Rahmanov said:" The presence of the 201 st 
Russian Division in Tajikistan is a guarantee of peace. If it had not been here, 
the number of people killed would not have been thousands but about a million. 
If it had not been Russia and Boris Yeltsin personally ... Tajikistan would have 
ceased to exist". 6a 
Russia by the Agreement of 25 May 1993, aimed at the prevention of 
two potential war zones ; Tajikistan and Afghanistan from joining into one zone 
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with the threat of a domino effect. The Agreement also strengthened Russia's 
political and military position along the Amudarya and Panj rivers, thus 
creating the conditions for preventing fighters and arms from being infiltrated 
from Afghan territory to Tajik territory .64 The Russian newspaper Krasnaya 
Zvezda of May 27 1994 published an article entitled 11 Russia and Tajikistan 
are back together again " which gave an extremely positive assessment of the 
Agreement between the two sovereign states and emphasized that the 
Agreement stipulates a joint policy, on defense and military technology, 
including financing military programs, and buying arms _65 During the signing 
ceremony, Yeltsin remarked that the borders of Tajikistan, which are 
simultaneously the borders of the CIS, must be guarded through their joint 
efforts. 
At the Collective Security Agreement signed by the leaders of the 
CIS in Tashkent in May 1992, Russia has taken upon itself to defend the 
borders of the states of Central Asia and prevent terrorists, arms, and drugs 
from finding their way through the CIS, into the countries of Europe. All of this 
indicates that the Agreement of 25 May 1993 increases Russia's authority in 
the CIS and particularly among the Central Asian states. The Agreement will 
also improve things for Russians in Tajikistan who have been subject to 
danger during the war when over 150.000 Russians were forced to leave the 
Republic. However, some circles in the Russia are afraid about the 
implications of the Agreement. On May 27, 1992 Nezavismaya Gazette 
published an article, 11 Is Russia being drawn into another unnecessary war ? " . 
66 The article asserted that the Agreement with Dushanbe could turn into a 
second Afghanistan. The article continued : 11 Russian military figures consider 
that the situation in Tajikistan risks becoming a carbon copy of Afghanistan, 
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with Russian troops in the valleys and partisans, some of whom are Afghans, in 
the mountains. Russia 's war with Afghanistan shows what would happen. 
Having signed a document for joint military action, Russia is being drawn more 
and more into another war that is totally alien to it ". Moreover, the 48 article 
concluded the signing of the Agreement would strengthen the position of the 
Tajik government, which would hardly improve the state of human rights in the 
Republic.67 
The specter of fundamentalist Islam over Central Asia is undeniably 
present, helped by the ideological vacuum arising out of the demise of 
communism , but it has been exaggerated out of all proportion .68 Islam in 
Central Asia is not and will not be homogeneous , and the future shape of 
Islam in Central Asia will surely depend more than anything else upon 
indigenous influences, and not on external alien ideologies. Russian foreign 
policy aims to ensure that political Islam does not grow to the proportion to 
endanger their interests and quake their sphere of influence. The impact of 
religion should be evaluated in context , alongside factors like the level of 
economic development, the performance of existing socio-political institutions, 
the influence of international actors, and the domino-effect of trends in other 
countries. 
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CHAPTER IV. TURKISH AND IRANIAN ACTIVITIES IN CENTRAL ASIA AS A 
FACTOR INFLUENCING RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY -MAKING AND 
RUSSIA 
The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the formation of a new state 
of affairs has introduced new states into the geography of Central Asia where 
there are many states playing for prominence in the economic, cultural and 
political arena. The intense structural change the Central Asian Republics have 
been experiencing requires urgent and organized outside help, where 
neighboring and related countries have a multifaceted interest in the Central 
Asian Republics. Though Russia remains to be the dominant external power in 
Central Asia, it percieves a challange to its hegemony by other outside powers, 
namely Turkey and Iran. Russian foreign policy has come to take into 
consideration the Iranian and Turkish activities and policies in Central Asia as 
an external factor of its policy formulation . 
Transition from the politico-economic paradigm of the Soviet period is the 
main theme in the Central Asian Republics, and interpreting and responding to 
this change is particularly important to bear up regional and international 
stability. Given that these states are trying to reconstruct a political and cultural 
history for themselves after years of communist domination, Turkey, Iran and 
Russia have a lot to contribute to their process of transition, and the so-called 
rivalry could help the Central Asian Republics in the supply of various services 
which they need urgently and desperately. Central Asia was projected to 
become the battleground for a new game between Iran and Turkey . The Islamic 
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fundamentalist front backed by Iran and the secularist front backed by Turkey 
are the players of the game . 
4.1. Turkey and Central Asian Republics: 
When the newly independent states had gained their sovereignty in a 
rather abrupt and unprecedented manner in 1991, they found themselves in 
need of a role model. The Soviet communist model was no longer there. The 
outside world looked at them to come up with rapid solutions to shoulder radical 
structural reforms, while undergoing gigantic transformation both economically 
and politically. The people had been torn between constant pressure to create 
the "Soviet man" and the folk culture which kept them Turkic and/or Muslim and 
different in the face of all Rusification attempts , including offers of better jobs to 
those who agreed to accept the Slavic manner. In the final analysis, however, 
they felt they had to turn to Turkey to acquire the know-how in order to adjust 
themselves to the outside world, the so-called "Western World" which had been 
closed to them. As Turkey was the only similar international entity able to boast 
of full integration into the world at large of course. Identities that were 
maintained in Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and 
Kazakhstan, were also similar to that of Anatolian Turks, linguistically, and 
culturally. They were introduced to internationally influential institutions, like the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the International Monetary Fund ( 
IMF) , the whole UN system. Powerful world groupings such as the Group of 
Seven (G-7) , the OECD, NATO, and the European Council and their members 
pointed Turkey as an acceptable model. 1 
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The Soviet policy was geared towards creating a new Soviet man, which 
was to be homogeneous in language, religion, culture, education in order to be 
able exert a full control over the communist system. The aim was to create a 
society composed of individuals of various origins, but centered around the 
common denominator of communism and the Russian language and culture. 
Turkey has unique assets at hand as to its relations with the newly independent 
republics of the former Soviet Union in Central Asia. This is a land mass of 3 
million square kilometers and a population of approximately 150 million. The 
diminishing sources of the world at an increasing speed, and the ever increasing 
competition for market share gives Turkey a further advantage of access to the 
untouched resources of the region. According to the Theory of Mackinder, the 
Heartland is now acquiring more and more significance, that the influence to be 
exerted in this region becomes very important. The vast natural and mineral 
resources, the great agricultural potential, and the ownership of strategic , 
nuclear and space technologies further the significance of the relations to be 
established between these states and Turkey. 
The newly independent Turkic states have all decided to follow market 
economies, but it is a long and harsh way to stabilization. It is a very difficult 
process towards transition, because the former Soviet republics used to be very 
much interdependent to each other, so Turkey has to be very cautious towards 
policy formulation. Although there is a tendency of loosening the ties and 
seeking for alternatives, one of the most important issues that Turkish foreign 
policy making has to take into consideration, is the extremely interdependent 
situation of the Central Asian Republics. 
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The imposition of the Russian language has been a tragedy for the 
Turkic peoples in that many offsprigs were not taught their native languages 
and Russian has been the lingua franca. It has been agreed at the Cooperation 
in Communication Conference held in 16-23 December , 1992 in Ankara that 
every measure will be taken to provide the union of terms among the dialects of 
Turkish. Today there are three alphabets under discussion to be used in the 
newly independent Turkish republics. The Orhun-Yenisey alphabet which 
represents the Turkish phonetics, the Arab alphabet which had been in use for 
100 years which has deep roots in religious, linguistic, philosophical roots, the 
Latin, and the Cyrillic. The idea that two alphabets have been already used and 
that they can not stand a third because it leads to discongruity between 
generations prevailed. Therefore, the Cyrillic will still be in use. Because, the 
trend in the world is towards the use of Latin Alphabet, the Republic of Turkey 
promrotes the use of that presently. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are the only 
two Republics where the Latin alphabet is in use. 
The Western countries were happy about the disintegration of the 
USSR since the dismantling of the huge military block freed them from the 
threat of nuclear and military confrontation. Yet, the announcement of the 
"Turkish World stretching from the Adriatic to the Chinese barrier " has not 
been received positively by the international community as it is considered as 
another grouping dangerous to the West. Turkey being conscious of this fact, 
seeks a role of bridge between the Turkish republics and the international 
Community. 
The 20 th century has brought great changes to the Turkish World , It 
was only the Turkish Republic and the Turkish Northern Republic of Cyprus 
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which enjoyed the spirit of independence. 2 Now there are nine independent 
Turkish states in the international system. The disintegration of the USSR at the 
end of the 1991 has opened new frontiers to the Turkish Foreign Policy . Before 
1989, Turkey's foreign policy was limited by constraints of the Cold War balance 
of power in the proximate region. Over a long period, starting from the post-Cold 
War I settlements of 1923, Turkey's international interests perceptibly extended 
beyond Asia Minor, and pre-imperial links with the Turkish peoples of Central 
Asia and the Black and Caspian Sea Regions. 3 The barriers due to the 
hegemony of Russia had inhibited Turkey from consolidating ethnic, cultural , 
and political links with those countries. Today the regions contiguous to Turkey 
are getting through new challenges and opportunities. Turkey, as it is often 
repeated, share a large degree of common culture, and language with the 
Central Asian Republics. Being a secular country, it has a further advantage in 
helping and bridging them into the international community. Last but not least, 
given its European connection, its participation in cooperative arrangements in 
the Central Asian Republics would link the former-Soviet Muslim states in a 
more organic way to Europe and to the international community. 4 It has tried to 
assist the access of the Republics to the international community and their 
membership to the UN and CSCE . There is a great opportunity for Turkey 
since a long time to play a leading, determining, guiding role in the region. 
In this aftermath of the Soviet disintegration , Turks have become 
more conscious about their diverse ethnic, religious, cultural, characteristics, 
and the awareness is growing day by day. One can share the spirit and speak 
Turkish ,communicate easily everywhere in Central Asia. The suspended 
relations with the cousins are now to flourish, and finally take its natural context. 
The exaggerated fear of pan-Turkism is played by Iran and other regional rivals 
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who have become anxious about the new augmented role of Turkey and the 
reemergence of the new Turkish community. 
4.1.1 The Turkish Model 
The socialist model which governed all aspects of life during 70 years is 
now null and void, having left 250 million people without a proper model and 
backward by Western standards. All successors are prone to choose the liberal-
democratic path for their future but changing a system totally requires huge 
costs, something that they can not afford alone . The need for a model came 
into the scene at this point . The West and especially the USA has articulated 
interest towards Turkey's playing a greater role in the area instead of Iran. All 
have an interest in backing a secular and democratic country guiding and 
modeling the newly independent, natural resource-rich countries. Central Asia's 
rulers are more drawn to Turkey because each of the republics' presidents is an 
advocate of a secular model of development .President of Uzbekistan Islam 
Kerimov said, for example, "The Turkish republic is the Venus Planet for all the 
Turkish peoples in the World , we have chosen our way; we are going to 
collaborate with Turkey shoulder to shoulder through our future and we will 
succeed."5 
Turkey constitutes a model of attraction economically and politically, 
and with many Turks of external background, it has the potential to become the 
cultural, economic and economic magnet for these countries. The Turkish model 
implies a socio-economic and political system. The people of Central Asia are 
now more distant to opinions and ideologies of Russia which still carry traces of 
communism. On the other hand, they do not feel close to the Western 
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community and culture not withstanding the fact that they are in need of 
modernization , development and prosperity while preserving their culture and 
society . Nor do they view the rule of the mollahs neither realistic, nor desirable. 
However, there is the Turkish alternative with which they share a common 
culture, linguistic background, religion, and race. This is not only why Turkey is 
attractive to the newly independent Central Asian republics. Turkey has the 
competitive edge in the latest technology in many fields. Western countries do 
not want to modernize old plants in Central Asia but prefer turn-key plants. 
Turkey can fill this gap and provide small and medium size enterpreneurship to 
Central Asia. 
As a consequence of the disintegration of the USSR , Turkey's role has 
gained much attraction in the international fora. Several press articles have 
pointed out to the fundamentalist threat focusing on Western anxiety over Iran's 
influence war and underlined Turkey's mission as a moderator . However, 
Catherine Lalumiere ( The General Secretary of the Council of Europe) in her 
trip to Central Asia said that the Turkish Model was an appropriate model for the 
newly independent successor states . Claus Schuman from the European 
Council said that Turkey was a member of the European council since 1949 with 
Islam at the core of its culture and society. It is because of this, that the Central 
Asian leaders emphasize the Turkish Model, being an independent and 
democratic social order.6 Technical and economic assistance by the Turkish 
Republic have been the major policy tools towards ensuring a balanced 
transition to liberal market economy and democratic government. In its search 
for pursuing an active and weighted foreign policy in the aftermath of the Cold 
War, Turkey has tried to institutionalize its efforts and Black Sea Economic 
Cooperation Organization Black Sea Economic Cooperation was instituted, 
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which is the centerpiece of Ankara 's efforts to develop a more active foreign 
policy. The Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization which was 
established in June 1992 in Istanbul by Turkey, Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Bulgaria, together with inclusion of the newly independent Republics, is the 
major Turkish initiative in an attempt for regional cooperation. The Black Sea 
Economic Cooperation Organization involves a gradual elimination of trade 
barriers among its members and the fostering of joint actions and cooperative 
approaches to common problems such as environmental degradation, 
communication, and transportation networks and the banking and finance 
sectors. 7 Reflecting a functionalist approach, the Black Sea Economic 
Cooperation Organization as well as the cooperation between the Turkish states 
are the institutional instruments of promoting peaceful and promising Eurasian 
area The Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) , already constituted by 
Turkey , Iran and Pakistan has been joined by the Central Asian Republics and 
the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is the second major Turkish initiative 
in the process of institutionalizing relations between Turkey and the Turkic 
World. 
Turkey aims at diversifying the trade and economic links of the 
successors. Turkey's approach has been overtly approved by the USA and 
European Union, Japan, and various trilateral cooperation agreements have 
been accorded for the extension of assistance to the newly independent Central 
Asian countries .. Turkey with its democratic and secular order has been able to 
establish triangular cooperation with European Union's Technical Assistance to 
the CIS (TACIS) sectional programs, in an attempt to seek finance for the 
realization of its projects in Central Asia. The Turkish government has been 
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defending the view that the integration of the Central Asian countries to the 
world economy at large is both essential and inevitable. 
Turkey's technical and economic assistance to the region has 
nevertheless been conducted with an eye to Moscow's sensibilities over the 
Russian minorities in the region. 8 Turkey's linguistic and cultural proximity could 
also be considered as a tool in countering the Central Asian people's 
mobilization towards fundamentalist Islam. Turkey's initiatives of television 
broadcasting and expansion of telecommunications links to the Republics have 
been significant in promoting images that there is also the secular alternative to 
the religious approach of Iran. Turkey was the first country to recognize and 
accredit ambassadors to the newly independent successor states and has 
signed more than 250 agreements and protocols with the Central Asian 
Republics in economic, telecommunication, transportation, training, banking, 
education, technical assistance projects. Private investment is an area where 
potential to further the ties is the greatest. Some 6000 Turkish businessmen and 
big firms are operating in the area and their commercial activities are under the 
guarantee provided by bilateral agreements on avoidance of double taxation 
and on the protection of investments. 
The shrinking resources in the world at a high speed, and the ever 
increasing competition for market share gives Turkey a further advantage of 
access to the unspoiled resources of the region. Turkey has the key to open 
these regions to the world markets . Also, the hydro-carbon reserves of the 
region constitute a major economic interest for Turkey, and has become a 
source of competition between Iran and Turkey while both states have 
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developed projects for the extraction of oil, and its transportation through 
pipelines laid under the territory of each state. 
Turkey has had similar experience in fighting the problems of transition 
in the near past . The Turkish people are very aware of their responsibility of 
assisting their brothers with the comprehension that their problems unsolved, the 
global community shall stay on dynamite. 
Nevertheless, Turkey must consider first of all, the inalienable and 
dominant role of Russia in Central Asia, even if not in the same manner in the 
times of the Soviet Union. Another hindrance is geographic discongruity; the 
problem of dependence on Iran for Turkey is accesibility may be used as a 
leverage over Turkey. The difficulties facing Turkish economy also may prohibit, 
interdict its possible further involvement in Central Asia. 
4.2 Iran and Central Asia 
Now that the diplomatic maneuver capability of Iran is free with the 
ending of the Iran- Iraq War, there is a new determinism to play the key role 
and the power to influence among the newly emerging Soviet Muslims. In this 
context, Central Asian Republics constitute a major target of Iranian foreign 
policy actions. Enjoying a favorable size and location, in the Middle East 
region, and together with the "Oil Factor", Iran has a reinforced potential to be a 
regional dominant actor. The feeling of encirclement Iran has been living with 
makes it try to utilize every forum to break the circle. In an attempt to stabilize 
Northwest Asia, it seeks to prevent a new Russian sphere in the geography, 
alleviate the upsurge of pan-Turkism and propagate Islamic solidarity. Iran 
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today searches for an identity by which it can assert itself nationally and 
internationally . Having had physical control over the Central Asian territory 
historically, the Persian culture has been dominant in Central Asia for centuries 
and has left a cultural imprint on the lives of the people in the given geography .9 
Iran enjoys a further advantage; it has vast resources of oil and 
nowadays it is trying to extend its influence over the Caspian Sea by nuclear 
arms delivery. Persian language having been the cultural language for a long 
time is also comprehensible in a large area, if not as much as the Turkish 
language. Iran plays for becoming the cultural center of Central Asia, and being 
an oil producing and exporting country, it has the necessary expertise and 
technology to assist the Central Asian Republics in producing and exporting 
their oil. Iran could also be the gateway to the Indian Ocean for the landlocked 
Central Asian Republics. It wants to exert control over oil supply in the area. 
The main objective of the latest five-year plan of Iran is to increase the 
non-oil exports ( wants to sell pharmaceuticals, farm machinery, cars and oil 
products to the ex-Soviet Republics) . It also wants to end its traditional isolation 
by gaining new friends from the Central Asian states fertile for the Iranian 
influence. 10 So, it is expected that Iran will concentrate on diversifying its trade 
link with the Central Asian Republics. 
The Islamic ideology is becoming more and more a part of the modern 
international relations, while filling the vacuum of ideology after the withering 
away of communism. The Uzbek President, Kerimov said in his 18 June 1992 
interview with Nezavisimaya Gazete said that he was worried by the growth of 
economic and ideological ties between Turkmenistan and Iran. The construction 
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of strategic highways between the two countries and the spawning of Iranian-
backed mosques eventually pose a threat to Uzbek territory . Kerimov also 
claimed that the Iranians were increasingly influential in Tajikistan and two or 
three Iranian aircraft land in Dushanbe. 11 The nature of their cargo will be a 
matter for history to discuss. Portraits of Khomeini have been shown on the 
streets of Dushanbe, and Uzbekistan accused Iran of supporting the lslamist 
front in Tajikistan. 
The language spoken in Tajikistan is a version of Persian and with the 
dissolution of the Soviet system, the rich Persian cultural heritage which for 
centuries bound together the ancient cities of Northern Iran with Buhara, 
Samakand, and Khiva can luxuriate again. Yet, this is culture of the pre-
Revolutionary Iran, and it is hard for Iran to become the model for the newly 
independent Central Asian republics . There are overlapping nationalities on 
both side of the ex-Soviet Iranian border, where Iran has a particular interest in 
the Muslim Republics and regions of the ex-USSR that once lay under the 
cultural domination of Iran. 
In recent years, Iran has funded the construction of many mosques, 
religious schools and complexes , and has been the major supplier of religious 
material not only in Tajikistan where it has a strong foothold because of linguistic 
and ethnic affinities, but also throughout Central Asia. Now Iranian leaders 
have announced that they must play a greater role in order to counter the 
influence of Turkey , which they claim is seeking influence in Central Asia in 
order to defeat the forces of Islamic revivalism .12 Yet, there are fears related to 
Iran's revolutionary style that it may become the model for the political system in 
Central Asia which would pose threats to the new world order. The policies of 
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Iran could encourage the Muslim Republics to adopt radical policies, and 
consequently mobilize them to own nuclear weapons which could threaten 
Western interests. However, Iran has to face a sectarian split with the Central 
Asian countries that with the adoption of the Shiite creed in the 16 th century , 
Iran became a barrier separating Central Asia from the other Islamic countries. 
Iranians are Shiite, a characteristic which they only share though partly with 
Azerbaijan . The West has always been irritated by the rise of militant Islam and 
Iran -backed fundamentalism. However, Iran's role in the region has become 
more pragmatic than ideological , with an emphasis on building commercial 
cooperation and cultural diplomacy with the Central Asian states, rather than 
exporting Islamic revolution . Iran, for example, has initiated the majma-i 
farhangi, a Persian speaking association linking Iran, Tajikistan and Afghanistan 
in the year 1992. Iran has also established the Caspian Sea Cooperation 
Council which includes Kazakhstan, Iran, Russia, Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan 
in 1991. 13 A center for the Study of Central Asia and the Caucasus CSCAC was 
instituted in 1991 in Tehran. 
A major project underway is the rail link project between Iran and 
Turkmenistan. The link will be through Mahshad in Iran and Ashkabad in 
Turkmenistan. Iran may offer access to the Gulf ports , providing an alternative 
to the traditional Russian routes to Central Asia and particularly to Turkmenistan. 
Various projects announced may not be materialized, but this is a clear 
indication that Iran has a pragmatic approach towards Central Asia. All these 
may drive us through the conclusion that Iran will not manipulate the Islamic 
factor in ways feared by the West, because this would harm its interests in the 
international arena. 
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Iranian President Rafsanjani has no interest in exporting the Islamic 
Revolution to Central Asia, which has started to loose its euphoria in Iran . 
What he wants is to establish good relations with the West, and in the process of 
the modus-vivendi, no radical policies as to the export of Islamic revolution to 
Central Asia is expected. The new Iranian modus-vivendi will inhibit its radical 
moves as it is feared by the international community, so we can say that Iran 
will not be playing the fundamentalist card overtly and by using the means the 
feared by the Central Asian leaderships. The fact that Islam is a source of 
identity formation in Central Asia does not necessarily mean that , this will be of 
a militant and expansionist nature. Thus, it is also an unlikely prospect that in the 
near future the Iranian attempts will amount to political domination in Central 
Asia. We expect to see merchants, but not mullahs in charge of Iranian mission 
in Central Asia. However, Russia is vey careful about Iranian moves in Central 
Asia to check its possible fundemantalist policies which are likely to endanger its 
position in the region. 
4.3 The new Russian Stance 
The enormity of the needs of the Central Asian countries, and the 
inability of the other countries, but Russia to meet them has more and more 
put the Russian factor onto the sceen. Russia will continue to be the 
dominant actor in Central Asia especially in terms of military and political 
issues. The Central Asian states are also pragmatically in favor of Russian 
military presence in their countries, though temporarily. This is not only for 
reasons of stability and security, but also to prevent economic collapse in the 
wake of systemic transition. Thus the new Central Asian-Russian relations 
must not be considered as one of dependence, but rather the natural 
106 
consequence of a once dependent relationship which cannot be overcome 
overnight as well as out of necessity. As the Central Asian countries gain 
their genuine national independence, Russia is expected to withdraw from 
the region. 
Militarily, Russian foreign policy has been driven by the belief that 
it is imperative to link its security policy to that of the Near Abroad. Thus, the 
protection of Russia's historical geopolitical environment will remain 
fundamental to Russia's foreign and security policy. In the draft of Russian 
Foreign Policy, the protection of the outer borders of the CIS implies a Russian 
version of the Monrovski Doctrine, in that it considers this as an urgent and 
inalienable task to commit itself to the security and stability of its Near Abroad. 
Russian action in Tajikistan indicated its serious commitment to this task. The 
Soviet legacies in the lands of the former Soviet Union augments Russian 
dominance in the Near Abroad in economic terms. These states need Russia for 
their exports, but mostly, the post-communist economic problems push them 
towards the convergence of their economic modeling. 
Russia is trying to reorient its foreign policy towards emphasizing Central 
Asia and incorporating them into its security and economic arrangements of the 
Russian Federation. Iran and Turkey must seriously consider and never 
underestimate Russia's dominance in Central Asia as an inalienable external 
power. After the disintegration of the USSR, many commentators had said that 
Russia would withdraw . It had first taken a pro-Atlanticist stance which was 
accompanied by a distancing from the Central Asia, but today it will be awkward 
to argue that Russia will relinquish its special status. Having just been freed 
from one form of political and economic dependency, however the Central 
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Asians have had enough of Big Brothers, so they obviously will not accept any 
hegemony no matter who and how it will be. On the other hand, Russia finds it 
very difficult to quit its interests and previous "sphere of influence's in its Near 
Abroad'. And it is not anyway. 
Another side of this story deserves analysis: Emilbek Kaptanbey ,wrote 
an article in the Asaba paper in Krygyzstan on 14 October 1994 headed 
Economic Union: ... Soviet Union ... Myth or Reality 11 in which he discusses the 
issue of rebuilding the Soviet Union. He criticizes the communists who are 
working on revitalizing the former Soviet Union and calls this a myth and 
concludes his article saying: 11 I agree with the authors of the Manifesto that , we 
should think of the future of children and grandchildren , but I am against the 
renewal of the USSR as a common state, because now we have to use a happy 
chance of being sovereign at last11 .14 
After the collapse of the ruble zone, things began to change a little 
between Russia and the Central Asian Republics. The nationalist trends in 
Central Asia began to underline that decision-making within the CIS pertaining 
to monetary and budgetary issues, were settled in Moscow . The Central 
Asian leaders came to thinking that the Russian central bank manipulated 
issues of money emission , credit lines and debt redemption to exert moral and 
political pressure on Central Asian countries. 1s According to the Asian 
Research Center in Pusan , in South Korea, 11 Central Asian Republics and 
neighboring countries are well aware that Russia is loosing its ability to pursue 
independent domestic and foreign economic policies. 16 The ousting of the ruble 
from Central Asia and the introduction of national currencies has brought further 
independence to the republics . Financial injections to Central Asia by Turkey , 
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China, the Arab countries, and Pakistan are growing day by day. Having a 
developed infrastructure for financial and economic cooperation, the Central 
Asian countries, have signed various governmental and private agreements 
where investments, credits and technologies are earmarked to production and 
affiliated economic sectors. 
Russia has some inhibiting factors before building of a sphere of 
influence: first of all, most of the successor states have been insistent and 
determined about preserving and promoting their sovereignty and they are very 
sensitive to any engagement restricting it. Secondly, Russia, in need of external 
assistance and in this shaky period of transition, has to reflect the image of a 
reliable partner in the eyes of the other CIS members and at the world 
community at large. Therefore, it should not go after imperialist and 
interventionist policies. Third, the failure of the ruble zone project in November 
of 1993, and the Central Asian economic union initiative launched in February 
of 1994, pointed out the economic limits of Russia's eventual hegemonic aims. 
Finally, the Eurasian area is already at the crossroads of the economic interests 
of many regional and global powers such as Turkey , India , Iran , Pakistan, and 
China as well as the USA and European Union. 
4.4 Turco-Russian relations in the context of Central Asia 
In the context of this thesis, relations between Russia and Turkey 
centered around their interests in Central Asia need special consideration. The 
Turco-Russian relations is in a process of finding a new equilibrium. In the 
context of Turco-Russian relations, Turkey's policies towards the territory of the 
former Soviet Union may produce friction among them, although there is no 
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official dispute among Russia and Turkey as to sovereign rights. Since the end 
of the Second World War , the parameters of the Turkish foreign policy were set 
up against Russia. 
Russia has declared its policy to prevent the emergence of new 
centers of power which may challenge Russian presence in its Near Abroad. 
Turkey's goal of forging closer relations with the states in the Near Abroad of 
Russia can constitute a direct challenge to its' interests in what is still seen very 
much a Russian sphere of influence. Turkey has until now formulated its 
policies with an eye to the Russian sensitivities, and tries to harmonize its 
relationship vis- a- vis Central Asia. 
As the new thinking developed in the former USSR , Russian 
reactions to Turkish role were positive. Russia favored Turkey instead of Iran 
and Saudi Arabia which sought to strengthen their position in Central Asia 
through fundamentalist policies. The Turkish role in Central Asia is not that of a 
separatist and pan-Turkist one. It is not probable in the future that an extremist 
nationalist leadership come to power in Turkey to go after pan-Turkist ends. Yet, 
Russia is uncomfortable with the growing Turkish fervor to assume a new 
strategic role in its Near Abroad . Demirel's call for a possible Union of Turkish 
states or any kind of grouping among the Turkish states in the backyard of 
Russia with Turkey is considered to be a direct challenge to Russian interests. 
In the Ankara Declaration issued after the Ankara Summit October 31, 
1992 , the participating states agreed to respect each others equality and right of 
non-interference in each others internal affairs. According to the Declaration, 
principles of democracy, secularism, social equality and market economy will be 
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promoted. Working committees will be formed in areas of commerce and trade, 
and the Foreign ministers of six 17 states will meet at least once a year. 
Nevertheless, the fear of returning to a different version of a Soviet system led to 
the exclusion of some clauses from the Declaration such as, the transport of oil 
through Turkey to Europe, the establishment of a regional , Turkmen, and Azeri 
oil through Turkey to the Mediterranean and to Europe, and the harmonization 
of customs among the Six. The Second Summit was planned to take place in 
1993 , but it has been canceled due to the crisis in Azerbaijan. The Second 
Summit then was made in Istanbul, between 7-9 October 1994, with the 
participation of the six Turkic states. The Summit was held with an eye to 
Russian sensibilities . Russia who has been anxious about the rising role of 
Turkey in its Near Abroad, was also irritated with the passing of tough 
decisions which could endanger its interests in the Near Abroad in that it may 
be perceiving Turkey as an enemy trying to steel the former Soviet Republics of 
Transcaucasia and Central Asia away from itself. Russia is determined to avoid 
the advent of pan-Turkish developments yet, the Six have tended in this Second 
Summit to be assertive in promoting cooperation among them. This new 
assertiveness has also been reflected in the speeches of the leaders of the 
Central Asian states. For example, Islam Karimov, the President of Uzbekistan, 
said that "Some speculations may be made, a third party may feel that there are 
contradictions in this document , yet this declaration is in conformity with the 
principles of UN and CSCE." 1s Askar Akaev, the President of the Kyrgyz 
Republic said that he considers this grouping as the vital means for promoting 
regional cooperation. And the Istanbul Declaration will enhance further regional 
cooperation among the Six. 19 Suleyman Demirel the President of Turkey 
underlined, that it was a grouping of states close to each other in culture, 
language, and religion , not in need of defending each other either individually 
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or collectively. "We do not need anyone to get worried" 20, Nazarbaev , the 
President of Kazakhstan, adding that the "Six has become a new significant 
reality." 21 It was also declared that maximum cooperation will be made to 
enhance the transport of oil and gas in Central Asia through the optimum and 
shortest way to world markets. 
Russian worries of Turkish role is also associated with fears of 
American involvement. They fear that USA is promoting Turkey in Central Asia 
as opposed to Iran, which is trying to fortify its position through fundamentalist 
policies. Turkey's image is good among mighty all the Turkic-speaking peoples 
of Central Asia. For example, Graham Fuller 22 argues that Turkey can not and 
will not reject a greater regional role forever. Turkey has all the factors but 
money to be able to play a leading role in Central Asia . What it needs to take 
into consideration is the sensitive Russian position in Central Asia where it calls 
the Near Abroad. Russia realistically will prefer the Turkish model for the 
Central Asian Republics who are in a period of shaky transition with plenty of 
problems which could easily alleviate and shake the balances in the region. 
The former socialist countries respect Turkey's fresh experience in its transition 
to market-economy . 
It has been underlined several times that Russia takes the issue of 
stability of its Near Abroad as a sine qua non to its own security and stability 
which in return very much depends on economic development. The 
disintegration of the USSR had driven strategists to reformulate the concept of 
threats, and the new NATO strategy has come to integrate into its new 
concept the control of the sources and routes of raw materials , instead of the 
traditional concept centered around the issues of security and stability. Being on 
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the way to Central Asia, where vast resources lay , Turkey has added a new 
asset to its strategic importance. Turkey and Russia must cooperate to help the 
Central Asian countries escape the problems of transition and lead them to 
prosperous future. 
Russia remains to be the main heir to the old USSR having inherited 
its great power status with all its attributes , ranging from its seat at the UN 
Securtity Council to the nuclear arsenal . Yet, the future seems less certain to 
Moscow. The Russian exodus from Central Asia, the growing role and influence 
of Turkey and Iran will surely increase, and means at the hands of the Russians 
to exert control over their Near Abroad will decrease. 
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CHAPTER V -CONCLUSION 
While the Cold-War has become history , Russia is undergoing serious 
reassessments of its new state borders , and national interests in the wake of the 
collapse of not only 70 years of communism, but also long years of colonial 
empire. 
Three years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the foreign policy of 
the new Russian Federation has gained some certainty. The major aim of 
Russia's foreign policy today is to gain recognition as a great power in the 
world, which requires a sphere of influence . After resolving the political crisis 
at home, Russian foreign policy within the context of the Eurasianist school , 
has increasingly become assertive. The very special link between the Central 
Asian Republics and Russia has been conducive to the birth of a new concept : 
the Near Abroad. This is not an automatic consequence of the inherited ties but 
is more than that because , Russia pursues active security, economic, and 
military policies in its Near Abroad. The territory of the former USSR constitutes 
a zone of Russian influence in which Russia declared that it has the legitimate 
right to a say. 
The presence of ten million ethnic Russians living in Central Asia make 
Russia more sensitive towards its relations with these states. One Russian 
Deputy Foreign Minister said:" Russia could not intervene militarily on the spur 
of the moment without incurring international isolation and possible sanctions, 
nor could it repatriate its nationals because Russia lacks adequate housing and 
employment for them."1 Thus we may predict that the way to protect the ethnic 
Russians will be through economic means or by drawing attention to violations of 
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human rights and negotiating agreements with the governments concerned. The 
Russian Foreign Policy concept published on January 25, 1993, promoted an 
urgent and inevitable need to protect the external borders of the CIS 2. The 
doctrine of the new Russian foreign policy was incorporated into its military 
doctrine in November 1993, which stressed its strategic interests in the Near 
Abroad. 3 
The Central Asian leadership want resident Russian military presence 
on their territory. The reaffirmation in all treaties of the existing borders between 
the republics and CIS is of considerable political significance , because it 
suggests that for the foreseeable future, Russia has no designs on the 
sovereign statues of the Central Asian Republics.4 
In the Conference on Security and Cooperation (CSCE) which was held 
in December 1994 in Hungary, the Russian President Boris Yeltsin , wanted 
authorization from the CSCE to act as the peacekeeping force of the former 
USSR region. In that, he wanted to control 12 states of the former USSR. The 
intervention in Mountainous - Karabag (an Armenian enclave within Azerbaijan), 
Tajikistan, Moldova, and its deployment of peacekeeping forces in the last two 
indicates Russian devotion for the Near Abroad. 
Asked in a poll whether they supported the idea of unification with the 
Slav republics the cost of which would be the loss of lives and money , 
Russians overwhelmingly replied "No". s In the past, the Russians living in the 
Near Abroad was used to criticize the government in the Parliament. Yet, today it 
is only Gennady Zyuganov, the leader of Communist Party, who advocates 
reunion and restoration of the former Soviet Union. 
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Reformer Yegor Gaidar, however, advocates isolationism. He says 
Russia must concentrate on its own economic and social problems, rather than 
reforming with the former union states. Because of domestic economic and 
political shortcomings, Russian involvement in the Near Abroad plausibly will 
not be permanent as feared by the international community. 
At the CSCE meeting held in Hungary in December 1994, for example, 
the decision was made to send a CSCE force to Mountainous-Karabakh as the 
first international peacekeeping force: This may be interpreted as a change of 
attitude by the West in that they did not trust the Russians to act alone. Probably 
leaving Russia all alone in the Near Abroad, frightened the Westerners of 
alienating a resource-rich region . Besides, Azerbaijan already publicly declared 
that they do not want an all-Russian peacekeeping force. 
The goal of the new Russian policy towards Central Asia is the 
preservation of the interests of Russians living in the Near Abroad and 
subsequently their own interests. Securing strategic stability in the post-Soviet 
zone within the framework of accepted international standards and rules of 
behavior in the democratic world will be mostly welcome by the others who are 
reluctant to interfere in Central Asia , where Russia is the only great power to 
assume responsibility. 
The result of the disintegration of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991 has 
brought many changes to Central Asia. The Central Asian Republics have 
declared their official independence but true independence, through economic 
and political foundations will take time. For nearly 200 years, the economic and 
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political futures of the Central Asian states have been shaped by events and 
decisions made by others. The transition period will take some time and in the 
end , a new post-Soviet generation will come to power. Only then will Central 
Asians be able to create their own unique system. 
Independence came suddenly and unexpectedly to the Central Asians 
when they were dependent on Russia for security, defense, finance, expertise 
and trade. Russia still remains to be the dominant power in Central Asia with its 
economic leverage, political influence, and military power , throughout the 
region. The presence of 10 million ethnic Russians in the area, continued use of 
the Russian language, Russian military presence in Central Asia, high levels of 
intra-trade, the persistence of communist institutions and "Soviet men" , as well 
as various agreements on many areas between Russia and the Central Asian 
states are the major factors contributing to the Russian influence in its Near 
Abroad. 
Today, not much has changed except for the relative diversification in 
trade and economic patterns. All one witnesses is the beginning of a long-term 
process of settling down into relationships and patterns of activity that will differ 
sharply from the Soviet period and even the present transition period. 
It is not easy for states, people and institutions to change in three years 
time. Although, significant cultural changes are in process such as the change 
of alphabets from Cyrillic to Latin, change of the names of cities, streets and 
boulevards, changing to education in local languages. Another sound change 
is in the process : the Central Asian states are diversifying their relations with 
other states, new economic partners from Western-Europe, the USA, Far East 
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and regional states like, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, and China. They are trying 
different options, yet they can not suddenly replace Russia with any other state, 
be it the USA, Iran, Turkey or China. No matter how strongly they were joined 
within the framework of other union states in the USSR, the well-entrenched 
economic, political, ethnic, cultural and ideological ties with Russia will remain 
dominant. 
The dilemma facing the Central Asian states is how to benefit from the 
continued military, financial and economic patronage from Russia without 
surrendering national interests, and control over their economies as well as their 
defense priorities. 
Despite the fact that the new states have shown great effort to declare 
their independence, their economies are still very interdependent . Yeltsin is 
aware of this relationship as to the economic and financial matters. The flow of 
intra-republican trade reveals this relationship.6 
The Iron Curtain that had divided Central Asian States from the rest 
of the world is now opening: the trading patterns are shifting, direct investment, 
private loans , official assistance and joint-ventures are becoming common 
features for them. Due to the unique economic peculiarities between the Central 
Asian Republics and the Russian Federation, it is predestined that a close and 
coordinated relationship is to continue at least for some two decades to come. 
The religious revival may potentially influence the domestic political 
evolution of the Central Asian Republics. Islam in Central Asia, with its 
traditional power, synonymous with nationalism, may mobilize people, 
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augmented with economic shortcomings, to be a radical and driving force. Yet, 
the lack of institutionalization, homogeneity, and sectarian differences will 
reduce the probability of external intrusions . Islam in Central Asia is not likely to 
experience the same revolution as the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
The decision to join the CIS on the part of the Central Asian Republics 
was mainly due to security considerations. Lacking a military doctrine, a viable 
army , arsenal and personnel ,economic shortcomings , having inherited only a 
small portion of the former Soviet military structure, the Central Asian States 
needed a security umbrella . The military guarantees provided to them through 
the conclusion of various Friendship and Cooperation Treaties with Russia, 
leaders of the Central Asian States started to issue declarations like the 
President of Kazakhstan " Kazakhstan recognizes the community of military-
political and economic interests with Russia and other countries of the CIS" .1 It 
is only Kazakhstan to have established a small military unit. As to the nuclear 
question, the fact that Kazakhstan is the only state which has nuclear weapons 
and various testing and production facilities is not very significant because 
Kazakhstan is among the first signatories of ST ART-1 and all the nuclear 
warheads were withdrawn to Russia . After receiving guarantees from Russia, 
Kazakhstan has granted the control of its nuclear weapons to them, though they 
are owned by the Kazaks themselves. Regardless of the nuclear issue, we may 
conclude that , the Central Asian dependence on Russia on matters of security 
and defense will continue to be a reality. 
The process of withdrawal is a sensitive process, and it is important to do 
so without surrendering Russian strategic interests. The West has a direct 
interest in Russia's defining a clear-cut post-imperial policy. They must pursue a 
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policy of balancing Russian sense of prestige and Central Asia's independence. 
The West must accept that Russia has authentic interests in Central Asia. 
Due to the uniqueness of the case, it is hard to foretell the larger 
outcomes of the special relationship between Russia and Central Asia. A great 
deal will depend on the Russian factor should an authoritarian rule be 
established like a ultra nationalist one in Russia, that will likely threaten the 
independence of the Near Abroad . And, this is a dilemma for the West, 
because on the one hand, the US for one, is helping to maintain the current 
power structures in Russia . On the other hand , this effort, at times clashes with 
Russian assertiveness in its Near Abroad. The outcome looks like a compromise 
and translates into giving a free hand to Russia . But in the long run , the cost-
benefit ratio may be well founded. 
The former Soviet republics of the Caucasus, and Central Asia have 
learned that that separation from Russia has not given them full political and 
economic independence. Thus Moscow has been retaining the means to affect 
the political stability the Central Asian republics and influence their economic 
development. 
It takes time to adopt to a post- imperial mentality, and Russia has to 
learn how to lose an empire and adjust according to its capabilities. Thus, 
"imperial disengagement " becomes sensitive then ever, given its unstable 
domestic political and economic situation. The domestic political chaos in the 
Russian Federation may end up with unsound policies towards Central Asia, 
where politicians use conflicts for their own interests and own political ends. 
Yet, although Russia is preoccupied with its serious domestic problems, its 
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large size, power and to an extent its tradition of a superpower mentality, will not 
allow it to withdraw from conducting an active international policy. The policy, no 
matter how far the international, regional and domestic systems have changed, 
will help withhold the historical, cultural identity and its geopolitical position as a 
Eurasian power. The drama taking place in Central Asia and in Russia in the 
post-Cold War era will continue to offer a wealth of material to historians in the 
future. 
124 
APPENDIX I 
(TABLES) 
125 
TABLE :1 
THE ATTITUDES AMONG THE RUSSIAN DISPORA ON THE l\IlGRA TION QUESTION, 
(AUTUMN, 1990) 
"Would you like to migrate to Russia or would you prefer to stay in this 
Republic, for ever ? " 
*percentages of responses to survey questions 
Response Kazahkstan Krygyzstan Ta_iikistan Uzbekistan 
Mif(rate 20 31 37 38 
Stay in tlte 63 42 38 36 
Republic 
Difficult to 17 26 25 26 
sav 
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TABLE: 2 
lnterrepublican Migration To Russia From Countries of the NEAR ABROAD in 1992-1993. 
Republics Arrived in Russia in Arrived in Russia in Departed from Russia 
1992 1993 in 1992-93 
Total In percent Total In percent Total In percent 
Uzbekistan 112.442 12.100 91.164 9.900 20.545 5.600 
Kazakhstan 183.891 19.900 195.672 21.200 68.703 18.600 
Kyrgyzstan 62.897 6.800 96.814 10.500 10.142 2.700 
Tajikistan 72.558 7.800 68.761 7.500 5.898 1.600 
Turkmenistan 19.035 2.100 12.990 1.400 6.165 1.700 
TOTAL 450.823 48.700 465.401 50.500 111.453 30.200 
*Data provided by Russian Federal Migration Service 
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TABLE : 3 
POPULATION DISTRIBUTION IN THE CENTRAL ASIAN REPUBLICS 
Population KAZAKHS UZBEKS KYRGYZ TURKMEN TAJIKS 
distribution, 
1989 
TOTAL 16563 19905 4290 3534 5109 
KAZAKHS 6535 808 37 88 11 
UZBEKS· 332 14142 550 317 1198 
KYRGYZ 14 175 2230 64 
TURKMEN 4 122 1 2537 20 
TAJIKS 25 934 34 3 3172 
RUSSIANS 6228 1653 917 334 388 
UKRANIANS 896 153 108 36 41 
B.RUSSIANS 183 29 9 9 7 
GERMANS 958 40 101 4 33 
TATARS 328 657 70 39 72 
KAR- - 412 - - -
KALPAKS 
UIGHURS 185 36 37 - -
KOREANS 103 183 18 - 13 
Source: Central Asia Today ( Moscow State University of African and Asian 
studies) no.3, 1993. 
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TABLE :4 
THE LIKELY RUSSIAN MASS MIGRATIONS OUT OF KAZAKIS TAN 
"How likely is it that there will be a mass migration of Russians out of 
this Republic in the near future?" 
* t 'percen ages o f t responses o survey Ques ions 
Very likely 2 17 44 35 
Fairly likely 22 54 35 45 
Not very likely 49 11 14 7 
Out of 4 5 0 0 
question 
Difficult to say 23 13 7 13 
Source:Pal Losto, "New Russia Diapora" Journal of Peace Research , 
30, May 1993 , 202. 
129 
Union Subsidies In 1991 
Ut,/>eklstan K ar.ak/stan Turkmenlstmt Kyrgyu·tan 1'aj/Alstan 
Rubles ·12 6 1.4 1.9 2.5 
(bn) 
%of 19.S 7.4 17.6 12.5 23.3 
QDP 
IMF Report and Economic Intelligence Unit (1993) 
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TABLE :6 
THE LIKELY RUSSIAN MASS MIGRATIONS OUT OF KAZAKISTAN 
"How likely is it that there will be a mass migration of Russians out of this 
Republic in the near future?" 
• f ·percentages o responses to survey crnest10ns 
Very likely . 2 17 44 35 
Fairly likely 22 54 35 45 
Not very likely 49 11 14 7 
Out of question 4 5 0 0 
Difficult to say 23 13 7 13 
Source:Pal Losto, "New Russia Diapora" Journal of Peace Research , 30, May 
1993 '202. 
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~ 
0:-
~ 
..... 
Major Industrial Goods and the situation of highways in the former Soviet Union 
Order Republics Electric Steel Paper Cement Material Shoes Highways 
energy . 
(billion kW/hr) (1.000 tones) (1 000 tones) (1.000 tones) (million m2) (Million Pairs) (1 000 km) 
1 USSR 1.722 160.096 6.315 140.436 13.137 827 966.2 
-
2 Russia 1.077 92.752 5.344 84.518 8.704 378 457.1 
3 Ukraine 295 54.807 353 23.416 1.250 194 166.7 
~ 
fd 4 
W. Russia 39 1.105 203 2.283 512 45 48.1 
5 Uzbekistan 56 1 080 26 6.194 762 44 39.8 
6 Kazakhstan 90 6831 3 8.650 330 35 86.6 
7 Georgia 16 1.429 28 1.530 123 17 21.7 
8 Azerbaijan 23 820 - 1.058 170 17 26.2 
9 Lithuania 29 7 117 3.410 218 12 20.9 
10 Moldova 17 685 - 2.258 224 23 10.2 
11 Latvia 6 555 138 776 125 10 20.5 
12 i Kyrgyzstan 15 ' 3 - 1.408 15 12 19.1 
13 Tajikistan 15 5 - 1.110 217 11 13.4 
14 ! Armenia 12 3 11 1.639 63 18 7.7 
15 Turkmenistan 15 2 - 1.057 54 5 13.4 
16 Estonia 18 11 92 1.129 235 7 14.8 
TAglE 8 
Gas 
(bn m3) 
Cotton 
(m tonnes) 
Coal 
(m tonnes) 
Oil 
(m toones) 
Natural Resources and Cotton (1992) 
Uzbekistan Kazakhstan Turkmenistan Kyravzstan Tajikistan 
42.8 8.1 60.1 0.1 0.1 
4.12 0.24 1.28 0.05 0.12 
4.7 127.0 - 2.2 0.2 
3.2 25.8 5.2 0.1 0.1 
Source: IMF and Economic Intelligence Unit (1993) 
133 -ai.lkcnt Unlvostlti' 
Llbmrr 
TA8lE .9 
Energy Imported from Rusia as a percentage of consumption 
Country Natural Gas Crude Oil 
Kazakhstan 0 0 
Krygyzstan 0 * 
Taj1k1stan 0 * 
Turkmenistan 0 16 
Uzbekistan 0 55 
*These Countries have no oil refineries and import refined oil products primarily 
from Russia 
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TABLE : 10 
INDEBTNESS OF FORMER SOVIET REPUBLICS TO RUSSIA THROUGH MID-1992 
COUNTRY AMOUNT 
Kazakistan 46.7 
Turkmenistan 18.1 
Uzbekistan 13.9 
Krvavzstan 4.5 
Tajikistan 3.7 
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